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Abstract 
This thesis examines the reasons Union soldiers voted overwhelmingly for Abraham 
Lincoln in the presidential election of 1864. This thesis bridges the gap between the emerging 
disagreements within the historiography of the soldier vote in 1864. The disagreements thus far 
deal with the role of emancipation in the Union soldier’s decision-making process versus the role 
of other issues, particularly whether or not the war effort should have been continued on to 
ultimate victory. By extension, the argument also deals with whether or not Union soldiers 
adhered to the Republican Party’s ideology in making their decision. Through analysis of 
primary sources including Union soldiers’ letters and diaries, the answer that emerges is that 
Union soldiers adhered to Republican ideology as outlined by Republican campaign materials as 
well as their party platform in making their decision for president. This thesis ultimately 
concludes that a focus on any one reason or another that soldiers chose Lincoln misses the larger 
picture.  
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1 
Introduction 
 In the late summer of 1864, President Abraham Lincoln requested that soldiers making 
their way home from the front stop and meet with him at the Executive Mansion. On August 18th 
and August 22nd, Lincoln spoke to the 164th and 166th Ohio Regiments, respectively. As the 
summer wore on without much military success, the presidential election approached and was 
likely foremost on the president’s mind. Lincoln took these opportunities to explain, in his own 
words, what was at stake in the ongoing contest. 
I suppose you are going home to see your families and friends. For the service you have 
done in this great struggle in which we are engaged I present you sincere thanks for 
myself and the country. I almost always feel inclined, when I happen to say anything to 
soldiers, to impress upon them in a few brief remarks the importance of success in this 
contest. It is not merely for to-day, but for all time to come that we should perpetuate for 
our children’s children this great and free government, which we have enjoyed all our 
lives. I beg you to remember this, not merely for my sake, but for yours. I happen 
temporarily to occupy this big White House. I am a living witness that any one of your 
children may look to come here as my father’s child has. It is in order that each of you 
may have through this free government which we have enjoyed, an open field and a fair 
chance for your industry, enterprise and intelligence; that you may all have equal 
privileges in the race of life, with all its desirable human aspirations. It is for this the 
struggle should be maintained, that we may not lose our birthright – not only for one, but 
for two or three years. The nation is worth fighting for, to secure such an inestimable 
jewel.1 
 
Lincoln argues that the ability for citizens to rise above the stations of their birth was at stake. 
This freedom to rise by the merits of one’s own hard work and enterprise was “an inestimable 
jewel.” Lincoln uses his own life as an example of this feature of the union. The ideology of the 
North during the Civil War was based much on the concept of union, which included the idea 
that the United States was a beacon of hope for the rest of the world in terms of republican 
government and personal liberties guaranteed to the people. Lincoln’s vision of the past, present, 
                                                 
1 Abraham Lincoln, The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, ed. Roy P. Basler (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers 
University Press, 1953), 7:512. 
2 
and future of the United States at the time surely resonated with Union voters, including the men 
fighting in blue. 
 The cause of union, among other things, weighed on the minds of Union soldiers as the 
summer of 1864 dragged on and the fall elections loomed. In the end, Union soldiers who were 
able to vote did so overwhelmingly in favor of Abraham Lincoln’s reelection to the presidency. 
Many historians agree that nearly eighty percent of Union soldiers who cast a ballot in the 1864 
presidential election did so for Lincoln.2 As of late, a historiographical argument has begun to 
take shape over the reasons why these soldiers were so favorable to the Republican candidate. 
Some historians have pointed to the issue of emancipation, arguing that Union soldiers’ 
overwhelming support of the party that included a proposed amendment abolishing slavery 
forever in their platform indicated support of that cause. Others have argued that Union soldiers 
were not swayed by emancipationist ideals, but rather decided to vote for Lincoln due to 
considerations having mostly to do with the continuation of the war on to ultimate victory and 
restoration of the union. Another historian argues that Union soldiers’ electoral choice did not 
reflect any sort of ideological conversion or support for the Republican Party, but was rather a 
pragmatic choice based on dislike for Peace Democrats and essentially reflected a choice based 
on the “lesser of two evils.”3 The purpose of this thesis is to provide a new answer to the 
perplexing issue of the soldier vote and the reasons why soldiers pledged their allegiance to 
Lincoln. I bridge the gap between these two competing historiographical assertions, arguing that 
Union soldiers who voted for Abraham Lincoln in 1864 largely conformed to the ideological 
                                                 
2 For example, see James M. McPherson, For Cause and Comrades: Why Men Fought in the Civil War (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1997), 129. 
 
3 Jonathan W. White, Emancipation, The Union Army, and the Reelection of Abraham Lincoln (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 2014), 109, 128. 
3 
tenets of the Republican Party of 1864, as expressed by campaign publications as well as their 
platform. In other words, Union soldiers did conform to the objectives of Lincoln and his party, 
including both emancipation and continuance of the war. Any focus on one issue at the expense 
of another loses this bigger picture. 
 By the summer of 1864, the renewed optimism that came with Ulysses S. Grant’s 
assumption of the command of the Army of the Potomac had faded. This happened as Grant 
fought for every inch of enemy territory, suffering devastating numbers of casualties in the 
spring of 1864 that then made their way into newspapers throughout the North. By July of 1864, 
Grant’s Overland Campaign had stalled. With this, along with the high numbers of casualties, 
war weariness set in upon the Northern populace. This weariness fueled the political aspirations 
of the Peace Democrats, often referred to as “Copperheads” by Republicans and their supporters. 
These Peace Democrats advocated an immediate armistice with or without military victory. They 
were also dead set against most if not all of the actions Abraham Lincoln had taken as president, 
including emancipation. 
 Due to the dismal military situation, Lincoln felt his chances for reelection vanishing. 
Spurred on by news delivered to him by advisors, including the politically astute Thurlow Weed, 
Lincoln requested that the members of his cabinet sign the back of a piece of paper without ever 
having seen the contents of the letter within.4 In this letter, dated August 23, 1864, Lincoln 
writes, “This morning, as for some days past, it seems exceedingly probable that this 
Administration will not be re-elected. Then it will be my duty to so co-operate with the 
President-elect, as to save the Union between the election and the inauguration; as he will have 
                                                 
4 Philip Shaw Paludan, The Presidency of Abraham Lincoln (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1994), 282-283, 
Abraham Lincoln, The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, ed. Roy P. Basler (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers 
University Press, 1953), 7:514-515. 
4 
secured his election on such ground that he can not possibly save it afterwards.”5 The 
information that prompted Lincoln to draft this memorandum was grim indeed: Thurlow Weed 
had told Lincoln that his reelection was out of the realm of possibility after hearing from political 
operatives from various states remaining in the Union as well as the chairman of the Republican 
National Committee and editor of the New York Times, Henry Raymond. Raymond told Weed 
“unless some prompt and bold step now be taken, all is lost.”6 Raymond reacted strongly to the 
Peace Democrats’ campaign tactics up this point. The Peace wing of the Democratic Party 
argued vociferously that a cessation of hostilities could be obtained if only Lincoln dropped 
emancipation as a condition of peace. Raymond went so far as to recommend that Lincoln extend 
a peace offer to Jefferson Davis, president of the Confederate States of America, on the basis of 
Union without mention of emancipation. Lincoln thought of doing so, but ultimately rejected the 
notion. 
 Lincoln, however, only rejected this advice after drafting a letter to Charles D. Robinson, 
a Democratic newspaper editor in Wisconsin. In the letter, Lincoln wrote, “If Jefferson Davis 
wishes, for himself, or for the benefit of his friends in the North, to know what I would do if he 
were to offer peace and re-union, saying nothing about slavery, let him try me.”7 While he 
ultimately did not send the letter, it is clear that Lincoln did not believe he would be reelected. In 
late August, the Republicans’ chances seemed to be slipping away as the army remained stalled 
and the war looked very much like a failed venture. 
                                                 
5 Abraham Lincoln, The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, ed. Roy P. Basler (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers 
University Press, 1953), 7:514-515. 
 
6 Ibid. 
 
7 Ibid., 501. 
5 
 Lincoln’s memorandum concerning the potential for an electoral defeat in November was 
written six days prior to the Democratic National Convention, which was to be held in Chicago 
on August 29th, 1864. The results of this convention served to solidify leading Republicans’ 
support of Lincoln in the coming election. The Democrats, split between those having supported 
the war effort in general and those calling for an immediate armistice, nominated War Democrat 
George B. McClellan with a Peace Democrat running mate, George H. Pendleton, on a platform 
written by Peace Democrats. This ideologically split ticket, as well as the pivotal second plank, 
or “war failure plank,” gave Republicans an issue to rally around. This issue was whether or not 
the Democrats were disloyal. The Republicans decided affirmatively, and continued to hammer 
this issue home throughout the rest of the electoral campaign. For the general population in the 
North, this issue certainly played out to the Republicans’ advantage, but it is also important to 
note that the fall of Atlanta and the battles of Mobile Bay and Cedar Creek also played a pivotal 
role in swinging the vote further toward Lincoln’s reelection. While those military victories 
served to ameliorate the negative voices on the home front, the victories simply served to assure 
soldiers they had made the correct decision already, for their support of Lincoln could hardy be 
said to have wavered much at all over the turbulent months from April to August 1864. 
The platform consisted of just six resolutions, or planks. The first expressed the 
Democrats’ “unswerving fidelity to the Union under the Constitution.”8 While this first plank 
speaks to the Democrats’ continued allegiance to the country in general, the second plank 
became a lightning rod for Republican charges of disloyalty and even treason. The second plank 
stated that, “after four years of failure to restore the Union by the experiment of war, during 
                                                 
8 Official Proceedings of the Democratic National Convention, Held in 1864 at Chicago (Chicago: The Times 
Steam Book and Job Printing House, 1864), 27. 
 
6 
which, under the pretence of a military necessity, or war power higher than the Constitution, the 
Constitution itself has been disregarded in every part.” The plank concluded that, “immediate 
efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities, with a view to an ultimate convention of the States” 
so that the Union could be restored and peace thus made.9 The third, fourth, and fifth planks 
spoke to the administration’s failures to observe constitutional law in relation to elections, 
disregard of states’ rights, and prisoners of war. The sixth, and final, plank assured that “the 
sympathy of the Democratic party is heartily and earnestly extended to the soldiery of our army 
and the sailors of our navy.”10 The platform that the Democrats adopted in Chicago was certainly 
antagonistic to the Lincoln administration, but hardly indicated disloyalty to the United States. 
Rather, it simply indicated an alternate political ideological choice. 
Alternately, the Republican platform, adopted in June of 1864, supported the continued 
military effort to restore the Union. The resolutions passed at the Republican National 
Convention expressed the party’s continued support to ending the rebellion by force of arms 
without compromise with those then in rebellion, unless it “may be based upon an unconditional 
surrender of their hostility and a return to their just allegiance to the Constitution and laws of the 
United States.”11 The Republican platform also promised continued support for the Lincoln 
administration as well as emancipation, while expressing gratitude for the sacrifices made by the 
                                                 
9 Ibid. 
 
10 Ibid. 
 
11 Abraham Lincoln, The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, ed. Roy P. Basler (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers 
University Press, 1953), 7:381. 
 
7 
Union soldiers.12 Concerning the future of the war, the two platforms were diametrically opposed 
to one another in terms of ideology, or the political goals and preferred methods to achieve those 
goals. 
 Given the political situation, the continuation of the war, and thus the survival of the 
Union, was clearly at stake in the coming election. Within this context, the election of 1864 takes 
on an air of utmost importance historically. Prominent Civil War historian James M. McPherson 
labels the election as the “third turning point” of the war, with the first turning point being the 
battle of Antietam and the subsequent issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation and the second 
being the 1863 military victories at Gettysburg, Vicksburg, and Chattanooga.13 The election was 
certainly a turning point in American history. Abraham Lincoln’s reelection was uncertain both 
within his own party and without. Through the summer, his chances became slimmer and 
slimmer as each day passed. This was an instance where American history could have gone 
forward on a variety of very different routes. Because of this, study into the deeper workings of 
the election is of a good deal of interest.  
Soldiers’ participation in both the conflict and the electoral referendum on that conflict 
make for an interesting study into this integral turning point in the history of the United States. 
Given the choice between war and peace, soldiers appeared to choose war overwhelmingly. The 
generally agreed upon figure has about four out of every five Union soldiers casting a vote for 
Abraham Lincoln. Historians have proposed several reasons for these soldiers’ electoral choice. 
The historiography of the “soldier vote,” as it has been termed by historians of the Civil War, can 
                                                 
12 Ibid. 
 
13 James M. McPherson and James K. Hogue, Ordeal By Fire: The Civil War and Reconstruction, 4th ed. (Boston: 
McGraw-Hill, 2010). See chapters seventeen, nineteen, and twenty-four. 
8 
be quite cumbersome as there are not many works devoted exclusively to this topic. Rather, the 
topic is generally discussed within the pages of historical works looking at Civil War soldiers as 
a whole. The first book devoted exclusively to the soldier vote was published in 1915 and written 
by Josiah Henry Benton. Titled Voting in the Field: A Forgotten Chapter of the Civil War, the 
book covers both Union and Confederate states and their individual efforts to secure voting 
rights for their respective soldiers in the field. The book is useful in that Benton records the 
legislative histories for each state in regard to this topic, but there is little in terms of analysis of 
the reasons soldiers voted the way they did. The only other book devoted solely to an aspect of 
soldier voting in the Civil War was not published until 2014. Historian Jonathan W. White’s 
Emancipation, The Union Army, and the Reelection of Abraham Lincoln argues that the soldier 
vote did not indicate any wholesale change in ideology among Union soldiers. In fact, White 
concludes, Union soldiers were not ideologically committed to the Republican Party’s support of 
emancipation and instead voted for Lincoln due to simple pragmatic considerations such as 
ending the war with the union intact. White’s work is in response to the long-held belief that the 
soldier vote indicated full support of the wartime Republican policy of emancipation. 
 The handful of historians who grappled with the soldier vote often did so through the lens 
of emancipation. Among the historians that White argues against are James M. McPherson, 
Jennifer L. Weber, and Chandra Manning. McPherson contended in his study of Civil War 
soldiers, For Cause and Comrades, published in 1997, that the overwhelming numbers of Union 
soldiers who voted for Lincoln was a “pretty fair indication of army sentiment on slavery” since 
the Republican platform supported a constitutional amendment outlawing slavery in the United 
9 
States.14 Likewise, Jennifer L. Weber argues in Copperheads: The Rise and Fall of Lincoln’s 
Opponents in the North that opposition to antiwar Democrats in the North encouraged soldiers to 
support Lincoln’s policies, including emancipation. This support followed with electoral support 
in 1864 and “turned many soldiers into lifelong Republicans.”15 Weber continues, arguing that 
soldiers’ “unqualified support” of Lincoln helped him to hold together the country.16 These 
arguments are precisely what Jonathan W. White takes offense to in his aforementioned 2014 
publication. For Weber, Union soldiers supported Lincoln wholeheartedly, endorsing 
emancipation while also voting against Democratic candidates due to what soldiers perceived as 
opposition to the war effort. Historian Chandra Manning also makes the case for emancipation’s 
role in influencing the soldier vote in What This Cruel War Was Over: Soldiers, Slavery, and the 
Civil War. Published in 2007, Manning’s book argues that soldiers understood slavery’s role in 
causing the war and so were willing to support Lincoln because he would “end it right by 
eliminating slavery once and for all.”17 In addition to the emancipation issue, historians have 
shed light on other issues soldiers may have taken into consideration when casting a vote for 
Lincoln. 
                                                 
14 James M. McPherson, For Cause and Comrades: Why Men Fought in the Civil War (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1997), 129. 
 
15 Jennifer L. Weber, Copperheads: The Rise and Fall of Lincoln’s Opponents in the North (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 2. 
 
16 Ibid. 
 
17 Chandra Manning, What This Cruel War Was Over: Soldiers, Slavery, and the Civil War (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 2007), 184. 
10 
 In addition to emancipation and opposition to Copperheads, historian William C. Davis 
points to Abraham Lincoln the man in explaining the reasons soldiers voted for the Republican 
candidate in 1864. Davis’s Lincoln’s Men: How President Lincoln Became Father to an Army 
and a Nation argues that President Lincoln endeared himself to the Union soldier through 
personal availability, his physical presence at army reviews, and executive clemency. This 
played a part in making Lincoln so popular among the soldiers, who remained loyal to the cause, 
as evidenced by the election results in 1864. Davis also argues that because of Lincoln’s actions, 
Union soldiers were much more willing to support controversial policies such as emancipation 
and conscription than the general populace. Thus, the election results were a direct result of 
Lincoln’s policies that served to endear him on a personal level to soldiers. 
 Additionally, within the emerging historiography of the soldier vote, there is an argument 
that soldiers were ideologically motivated as citizen-soldiers. Historian Joseph Frank Allen 
makes this argument in With Ballot and Bayonet: The Political Socialization of American Civil 
War Soldiers. Frank’s meta-argument seeks to explain why soldiers were willing to continue 
fighting a war that was becoming increasingly brutal without any end in sight. However, the 
election of 1864 and the soldier vote clearly fall into the subject matter. Frank’s explanation of 
the soldier vote and the reasons for support of Lincoln includes soldiers’ political awareness. 
These citizen-soldiers were able to differentiate the man McClellan from his platform, which 
advocated an immediate cessation of hostilities. Union soldiers “rightly suspected that a 
Democratic victory was synonymous with dissolution of the Union if the South could survive as 
a political entity.”18 Historian Reid Mitchell comes to the same conclusion in Civil War Soldiers, 
                                                 
18 Joseph Allen Frank, With Ballot and Bayonet: The Political Socialization of American Civil War Soldiers 
(Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1998), 117-118. 
 
11 
first published in 1988. Mitchell concludes that Union soldiers “viewed McClellan’s candidacy 
as a threat to the Union.”19 Frank and Mitchell both find Union soldiers to be ideologically aware 
of the consequences of the election. 
 There are several other books on the election of 1864 within the historiography, but they 
hardly deviate from these basic historiographical distinctions. These include works of popular 
history by John C. Waugh and Charles Bracelen Flood titled Reelecting Lincoln: The Battle for 
the 1864 Presidency and 1864: Lincoln at the Gates of History, reflectively, as well as others like 
historian David E. Long’s The Jewel of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln’s Re-election and the End of 
Slavery. These three, for example, all make the case that the election of 1864 was a pivotal turn 
in the course of the war. They add little to the historiographical debate of the soldier vote. 
 After careful reading of the historiography as well as research into soldiers’ letters and 
diaries, it becomes evident that any one answer as to why soldiers chose Abraham Lincoln in 
1864 is insufficient. Rather, new synthesis is required wherein all of the political issues at hand 
in the summer and fall of 1864 are taken into account. Union soldiers, who are generally 
acknowledged to have been fairly knowledgeable of political issues at home, cast their ballots for 
Abraham Lincoln because they felt he best represented their wishes for the nation. It appeared 
that Union soldiers had already accepted the policy of emancipation by the summer of 1864, as 
the topic did not grab their attention nearly as much as that of disloyalty and antipathy towards 
the peace wing of the Democratic Party often labeled “Copperheads.” Union soldiers’ acceptance 
of emancipation as well as their stance on continuing the war to total victory and restoration of 
the Union fit squarely into the Republican Party’s ideology in 1864. In voting for Lincoln, they 
made a purely ideological choice. In addition, a remarkable phenomenon is seen in soldiers’ 
                                                 
19 Reid Mitchell, Civil War Soldiers (New York: Penguin Books, 1997), 188. 
12 
writings concerning the presidential election of 1864: they viewed it as another battle that had to 
be won for the North to prevail over the rebellion. This blend of the political and military 
objectives of the war is Clausewitzian in nature and adds another piece to this fascinating piece 
of Civil War history. 
 This thesis focuses largely on why soldiers voted the way they did. As such, there is little 
analysis into the “how” of soldier voting. It is pertinent to merely state that soldier voting, if it 
was done in the field, was done in one of two ways. Soldiers from states providing for these 
absentee ballots either allowed soldier votes to be sent in directly and tabulated separately from 
the general vote or they allowed soldiers to vote by proxy. Soldiers voting by proxy sent their 
ballot in a closed envelope to an authorized citizen to act as a representative in their behalf. One 
state that allowed this proxy method was New York. Due to the nature of this proxy method 
concerning soldier voting, it is nearly impossible to determine any statistics on the soldier vote in 
that state, as they were not counted separately. The states that allowed soldier voting in time for 
the presidential election in 1864 were Wisconsin, Minnesota, Michigan, Missouri, Kentucky, 
Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Maine, California, Massachusetts, New York, Connecticut, 
Pennsylvania, and New Hampshire. Those states that either never passed legislation allowing 
soldiers to vote from the field or did not do so in time for the election were Illinois, Delaware, 
New Jersey, Rhode Island, Indiana, Nevada, and Oregon.  
In the states of Illinois and Indiana, specifically, there is large evidence of the Lincoln 
administration’s efforts to overcome the challenge presented by the lack of legislation supporting 
soldier voting. The evidence most often pointed to is Lincoln’s request that General William T. 
Sherman furlough some of his troops so that they may participate in the state elections in Indiana 
13 
in October of 1864.20 Republicans believed that the electoral results from the three states that 
held elections in October for representatives to Congress would indicate which party they would 
support in November. And so the state elections in Indiana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania were given a 
great amount of attention. Efforts were also made in November by the administration, state 
officials, and the soldiers themselves, to secure furloughs for soldiers to return home to vote in 
the presidential election. 
This thesis is divided into three parts. In the first chapter, I will discuss the issue of 
emancipation and its effect on the electoral choice made by Union soldiers. I come to the 
conclusion, like many historians, that Union soldiers came to accept the policy of emancipation 
after initial hesitation but that many soldiers fail to mention emancipation during the run-up to 
the election. Rather, they wrote on the topic that occupied their minds solely in the summer and 
fall of 1864: disloyalty and the Democratic Party. If soldiers were particularly against the policy 
of emancipation in 1864, they undoubtedly would have mentioned the proposed amendment to 
the Constitution advocated in the Republican Party platform but they do not. Instead, the few 
who do reveal insight into the Union army’s thoughts on emancipation align perfectly with the 
Republican campaign message on emancipation: that it was a worthwhile military tactic that 
would help to end the war with victory. In this light, it is reasonable to conclude that Union 
soldiers, at the least, gave tacit approval to Lincoln’s emancipation policies by voting for him on 
a platform that included continued support for the measure of emancipation. 
                                                 
20 Abraham Lincoln, The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, ed. Roy P. Basler (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers 
University Press, 1953), 8:11. On September 19th, 1864, Lincoln requested that Sherman furlough Indiana soldiers in 
time to vote in the state election taking place on October 11th. He writes, “The State election of Indiana occurs on the 
11th of October, and the loss of it to the friends of the Government would go far towards losing the whole Union 
cause.” He assured Sherman that this was not an order, and only to send the troops if he could spare them. He also 
stated that they need not stay for the presidential election in November. 
14 
 The second chapter deals exclusively with the issue of disloyalty. Republicans made 
disloyalty a major issue in the campaign for the presidency and their arguments against the 
Democratic Party are mirrored in the writings of Union soldiers. The soldiers’ writings argue 
against the Democratic Party’s adopted platform, which they felt referred to the war as a failure. 
They also express their wish to continue the war until victory could be achieved, whereupon the 
union would be restored. This way, their comrades’, as well as their own, sacrifices would not 
have been made in vain. Soldiers’ emotive language, as well as their parallels to Republican 
campaign literature, point to the disloyalty issue’s being the main reason why soldiers voted for 
Abraham Lincoln in 1864. 
 The third chapter discusses one of the ways Union soldiers conceptualized the election of 
1864 and its importance. They came to view the presidential election as yet another battle that 
must be won in order to end the war victoriously. This phenomenon provides another layer to our 
understanding of the decisions made by Union soldiers in relation to the election of 1864 and so 
is worth discussion. It also perhaps shows an effect of the disloyalty issue, as the Republican 
Party becomes representative for the Union while the Democratic Party becomes representative 
of the Confederacy. 
 It is worth noting that the soldier letters and diaries I consulted in this study are drawn 
from every state that stayed within the Union in the American Civil War. I did not leave out the 
voices of Union soldiers from those states that barred voting in the field. For example, many 
soldiers from the state of Illinois were unable to vote unless they were able to secure furloughs 
home to do so. Some were able to do this; many were not. According to the research, a soldier’s 
geographical place of origin did not have much of an impact as to their outlook on the election. 
15 
In fact, many of the soldiers from southern Illinois were much more supportive of Lincoln than 
those they left at home. 
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Chapter 1 – Union Soldiers, Emancipation, and the Election of 1864 
Upon receiving news of the results of an election in Louisiana, William Roberts Jr. 
proclaimed it “a glorious Union Emancipation triumph.” Roberts viewed the results as a clear 
indication of “the Union as it will be: free from the accursed shackles of a despotism, born of 
Slavery.”21 He continues his March 6th, 1864 letter by widening its scope past the results of a 
state election in to-be-reconstructed Louisiana to the upcoming presidential election in 
November. Roberts states that Abraham Lincoln is his choice for president. He argues that 
Lincoln has 
kept the ship of state bearing bravely onward firm and unflinching at his Post, like a true 
patriot should ever be. Then came his crushing Proclamation of Emancipation. Ever since 
the day that was issued, our Arms have been crowned with success. before disaster and 
defeat loomed darkly over us.22 
 
Roberts, a Philadelphia native and company clerk in the 28th Regiment of the Pennsylvania 
Volunteer Force, writes much clearer of his opinion on the subject of emancipation and its 
relation to the elections of 1864 than his fellow Union comrades. Roberts notes what he 
perceives as the military benefits received from the Emancipation Proclamation, which Lincoln 
perhaps issued in order to keep the “ship of state” afloat. Research shows that many Union 
soldiers who mentioned emancipation in their letters did not do so in direct relation to the 
election of 1864 and showed very little ideological attachment to emancipation as an issue within 
the election. However, this is deceiving. The few soldiers who did mention emancipation often 
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conformed with Republican ideology on the subject while those who failed to mention the issue 
argued other reasons why Lincoln should win another term. 
In studies of the American Civil War, the topic of emancipation commands a large 
amount of attention. This is especially true for those studies involving the soldier vote, the 
election of 1864, and the reelection of Abraham Lincoln as president of the United States. 
Historians grapple over the reasons why Lincoln received so much support from the soldiers 
during the election of 1864, and one of the chief concerns revolves around the question of the 
role emancipation played in their decision-making. Jonathan W. White is the latest historian to 
enter the argument in his study entitled Emancipation, The Union Army, and the Reelection of 
Abraham Lincoln. White argues, “the Union armies – while becoming de facto armies of 
liberation – did not necessarily have an ideological conversion to the Republican war measure of 
emancipation. For many northern soldiers, restoring the Union was the only true goal of the war 
from beginning to end.”23 White’s conclusions are in direct disagreement with historians such as 
James M. McPherson and Jennifer L. Weber, who argue that Union soldiers’ support of Lincoln 
in the election of 1864 proved their commitment to the Republican Party’s support of 
emancipation. 
As discussed in the introduction, the historiography of the soldier vote’s role in the 
reelection of Abraham Lincoln seemed to have come to a consensus until very recently that such 
landslide proportions of soldiers voting for or supporting Abraham Lincoln gave clear indication 
of their sentiments regarding all tenets of the Republican Party’s platform in 1864, including 
emancipation. It is not my purpose here to dispute the 78% figure, as Jonathan W. White has 
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done, but to reassess the emancipation issue’s role in the soldiers’ estimations of the Lincoln-
Johnson ticket in November of 1864.24 Through the use of soldiers’ letters and diaries, this 
chapter aims to show that when Union soldiers wrote on emancipation and slavery, they did so in 
ways that did not usually indicate that it was their primary reason for voting a certain way in the 
presidential election. Rather, soldiers referred to slavery as the cause of the national struggle, 
while finding the act of emancipation as a necessary act in prosecuting and winning the war. 
However, their relative silence on the issue during the election season may also speak volumes: 
if soldiers did not take the time to denounce Lincoln because of emancipation and slavery, then it 
may logically signify apathy, acceptance, or tacit approval. Given the campaign literature spread 
through camps before the election as well as the interest of soldiers in talking politics, this 
silence most likely represents the latter. 
The notion of emancipation as a war aim entered the national consciousness upon 
issuance of Abraham Lincoln’s Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation on September 22nd, 
1862. Lincoln, after much deliberation on the subject, decided that it was of military necessity to 
seize all of the property and war-making materials of the Confederacy, including slaves, in order 
to potentially shorten the duration of the war. When the Confederate states failed to surrender to 
the Union before January 1st, 1863, Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation, cementing 
emancipation as an official war aim. The proclamation freed the slaves residing in states or areas 
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of states then in rebellion and effectively turned the Union army into an army of liberation. This 
was met with mixed reactions among Union soldiers. According to Jonathan W. White, a good 
number of them either resigned or deserted in response to this new war aim.25 James M. 
McPherson accounts for this divide in opinion amongst the soldiers, noting “two-fifths of them 
[Union soldiers] came from Democratic backgrounds and another tenth from the border states.”26 
Thus, it seems reasonable to have expected to see a backlash within the Union army. The issue of 
emancipation inspired many campfire discussions and arguments between Union soldiers, and as 
McPherson put it: “the cause of Union united Northern soldiers; the cause of emancipation 
divided them.”27  
However, as the prevailing historiography suggests sans Jonathan White, sentiments 
concerning emancipation as a war aim softened to acceptance and even support as time went on. 
McPherson states, “But these were distinctly minority views among Union soldiers by 1864. 
When Lincoln ran for reelection on a platform pledging a constitutional amendment to abolish 
slavery, he received almost 80 percent of the soldier vote – a pretty fair indication of army 
sentiment on slavery by that time.”28 McPherson’s assertion, although he does not come right out 
and say it, is that Union soldiers were conscious their vote would go toward abolishing slavery, 
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and were either in favor of it or at least did not think it the most vital issue of the election. 
Jennifer L. Weber, in her study of Copperheads, those Peace Democrats opposing the Lincoln 
administration and its conduct of the war, goes one step further. She argues that the soldiers’ 
animosity toward this “antiwar faction helped bring most of the army behind the Emancipation 
Proclamation within a year of Lincoln’s first announcing it, and turned many soldiers into 
lifelong Republicans.”29 Historian William C. Davis agrees in the pages of Lincoln’s Men: How 
President Lincoln Became Father to an Army and a Nation, arguing that soldiers’ personal 
feelings toward Lincoln as well as their pragmatism allowed them to support emancipation as a 
war aim and ultimately as a piece of the 1864 Republican platform. 
The soldiers represented in this study rarely mentioned the issue of slavery, but when 
they did, it was largely in relation to the issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation or in relation 
to the presidential election. Within the historiography of late, the issue largely concerns the 
question of whether or not the soldiers bought into the Republican Party’s ideology concerning 
abolition, or whether the soldiers were simply being pragmatic in their choice of Abraham 
Lincoln as president. This chapter argues that soldiers often took a pragmatic view towards the 
emancipation issue, and often did not make explicitly moral arguments against the institution of 
slavery. This is very much in line with the way the Republican Party campaigned for the 
presidential election. Indeed, Republican pamphlets and newspapers rarely used emancipation as 
a positive force, and when it was mentioned, it was largely in order to characterize it as a war 
aim. Union soldiers supporting the emancipation efforts of the Lincoln administration often 
pointed to slavery’s nature as the cause of the war and emancipation thus being an effective way 
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of ensuring a lasting peace once the war was over. They also vocalized this support in arguing 
that it was an act of war and was a necessity in ending the war more quickly. This was very 
much in line with the Republicans’ message during the campaign. This alignment with the 
Republicans indicates ideological support for the party of Lincoln in the election of 1864. 
Given the Union army’s mixed feelings concerning emancipation in the beginning, it is 
important to look at those soldiers who were for the emancipation measure and the reasons why 
they supported it. The research shows that the opinions expressed in favor of emancipation from 
the beginning of its official military relevance were also largely the prevailing opinions of Union 
soldiers during the summer and fall of 1864. These arguments in favor of emancipation likely 
helped Union soldiers decide whether or not to support Lincoln in his bid for reelection. There 
were a couple distinct reasons soldiers supported emancipation, according to the research. 
Soldiers who supported emancipation often did so by pointing out that slavery was the root cause 
of the war and thus must be terminated and by agreeing with the Lincoln administration that 
emancipation was an act of war and thus a military necessity. There were also a minority of 
soldiers who supported the measure for moral reasons, as well as those who were swayed by 
personal interactions with blacks they met during the war: black troops, freedmen, and slaves. 
Those soldiers who favored emancipation because of slavery’s perceived role in starting 
the war often felt that removing the institution from American life may help to make a lasting 
peace between the two sections of the United States. Many soldiers desired peace, and some of 
these clarified that only a lasting peace was acceptable lest the country find itself again 
embroiled in civil war a few years hence. 
Union soldier Martin Parkhurst, of Illinois, looked back on the very start of the war, 
arguing that the South actually fired upon Fort Sumter in order to save the institution of slavery: 
22 
“You will recollect about 4 years ago the naybobs of the south inaugurated this awful rebellion 
by firing on Sumpture all for the purpose of preserving slavery and by so doing they distroyed it 
and then themselves a great mistake in their own judgment.”30 Parkhurst puts the blame squarely 
on the South for both the start of the war and for their own destruction. In fact, he writes, the 
Confederates had by doing so destroyed not only slavery, but also themselves. While Parkhurst 
reflects on this fact late in the war after the surrender of Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern 
Virginia, Pennsylvania soldier Richard Margerum points to slavery as the cause of war in 
January of 1864. 
Do you think Old Abe Will be Nominated Again for President. I hope So William my 
motto is Now – go In – And turn loose every Negro – As Slavery have Caused so many 
lives to be lost. Now let us finish the Ungodly Institution All together.31 
  
Unlike the Parkhurst quote above, Margerum discusses emancipation and slavery within 
the context of the Lincoln’s chances in the impending presidential election, which was a rare 
occurrence within the trove of soldier letters and diaries consulted here. Margerum implies that 
Lincoln’s election would have the effect of ending both slavery and the war, while also blaming 
the heavy loss of life on the institution. While the loss of life was a significant aspect of the war, 
the emphasis on slavery having caused the war itself was also significant. James M. 
McPherson’s For Cause and Comrades demonstrates this point explicitly, “while restoration of 
the Union was the main goal for which they fought, they became convinced that this goal was 
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unattainable without striking against slavery.”32 McPherson then elaborates by producing 
several examples of Union soldiers who grasped the idea that the institution of slavery had 
begun this fratricidal conflict as early as 1862. One of the soldiers quoted by McPherson, a 
private in the 5th Iowa, wrote, “untill this cause is removed and slavery abolished, the rebellion 
will continue to exist.”33 Awfully prescient, these views continued to manifest themselves, and 
are backed up by the research. Thomas F. Miller, of the 29th Illinois, wrote in January 21, 1863, 
that while he did not believe Lincoln ever intended to free the slaves, Lincoln had come to the 
conclusion that in order to win the fight, emancipation must be carried out: “So I think the 
President has after So long a time arrived at th conclusion that th thing that Caused this Great 
trouble will have to be removed before this thing Can or will be Settled.”34 
These soldiers believed, and others came to believe, that slavery must be eradicated in 
order to return the nation to a state of peace. Illinois soldier John C. Dinsmore believed this to 
be true, writing, “Even if we could supress the rebellion and leave the main root [slavery] 
wheare it was before, it wouldent be long before they would try the same game as before, but if 
we take a way the main root of Evil and confiscate all ther property they will have nothing to 
fight fore hereafter.”35 Dinsmore concludes his letter, writing that he feels he has given an 
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accurate representation of his comrades’ views concerning the Emancipation Proclamation and 
hopes to see it carried into effect.  
Family members may have had an effect on the disposition of soldiers towards 
emancipation. An uncle Carlyle wrote to nephew William L. Dillon, of Marion County, Illinois, 
about the episode at Fort Pillow, a Union garrison on the Mississippi River. Confederate Major 
General Nathan Bedford Forrest attacked the fort and his men murdered black Union soldiers as 
well as their commander after the Union force had already surrendered. This action caused an 
outcry through much of the North, including Dillon’s uncle, it seems. Carlyle wrote, 
If I was a soldier and in the service and had the power I would feel like taking vengeance 
on them having for a watch word “Remember Fort Pillow” I know it is hard to have saw 
a Brother show down as criminals for the crime of being loyal and of trying to sustain the 
government. As I am like you I want to see this wicked rebellion cease. I want an 
honorable peace one that is lasting. I want the cause of war removed and then I think we 
will have a permanent peace.36 
  
Carlyle here decries the slaughter of Union soldiers white and black at Fort Pillow while also 
raising the issue of loyalty to the United States government. The implication of this letter is that 
Carlyle believes in order for the government to be saved, the very cause of the war must be 
removed. Due to subsequent letters written by his nephew, William L. Dillon, it is likely the 
cause of the war cited here is slavery. Dillon feared, much like his uncle, that the Union 
government would collapse and in its place the Confederacy and Copperheads would establish a 
despotism that would be “death alike to both white & black!”37 
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Union soldier William Roberts Jr., who is quoted at the beginning of this chapter, 
realized the role slavery had played in bringing about the war and expanded upon this belief by 
arguing that Abraham Lincoln was the sole candidate able to navigate the stormy seas that the 
Union now weathered: 
Old Abe is my choice. The man who has been through the fiery furnace of affliction as he 
has; who, (when all looked dark & cheerless and the black spirit of despotism and 
anarchy shrieked with joy at the apparent downfall of freedom) still kept on in the path 
God had marked out for him & encouraging others by his cheerful manner & conduct, 
still kept the ship of State bearing bravely onward firm and unflinching at his Post, like a 
true patriot should ever be. Then came his crushing Proclamation of Emancipation. Ever 
since the day that was issued, our Arms have been crowned with success. before disaster 
and defeat loomed darkly over us.38 
 
Remember that Roberts imagined the Union as it would be, “free from the accursed shackles of a 
despotism, born of Slavery.”39 After declaring the cause of the present struggle, Roberts declares 
his support for Lincoln, and describes the qualities he feels that Lincoln engenders: steadfastness 
and bravery. Finally, Roberts gives an example of Lincoln’s tact: the issuance of the 
Emancipation Proclamation, which contributed to military success and hope where before neither 
could be found. This marks the second view that both Lincoln and the soldiers supporting the 
emancipation measure held: that emancipation was a necessary war measure. 
  The soldiers who wrote favorably on the topic of emancipation in relation to Lincoln’s 
bid for reelection often did so by pointing out emancipation’s role as a war measure. They 
reasoned that emancipation took away Southerners’ means of production. Some also pointed out 
that the Union could benefit from arming the slaves. Thus the institution of slavery was able to 
become the South’s weakness as well as a Union strength. Along with the argument that slavery 
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as an institution should cease in the United States, the Republican political press in the 
presidential campaign perpetuated the argument that emancipation was beneficial and even 
crucial to the war effort. 
 Some of the soldiers favoring emancipation fit into the arguments made by historians that 
soldiers became more and more amenable to Republican ideology as the war progressed. These 
historians, including James M. McPherson and Reid Mitchell, argued that as the war wound on, 
Union soldiers saw the pragmatic benefits of emancipation as a war policy.40 McPherson cites a 
Pennsylvanian private who stated, “I have always until lately been opposed to abraham linkins 
proclamation but i have lately been convinced that it was just the thing that was neded to weaken 
the strength of rebls.”41 Another soldier cited by McPherson agrees, arguing that if the Union 
could make use of rebel property, then they ought to take their slaves away as well.42 An 
Illinoisan from the 37th Illinois agreed, stating, “we are to inflict so much the greater injury on 
rebels by the terms of the President’s glorious Emancipation Proclamation.”43 
 Some Union soldiers rationalized emancipation by viewing it as necessary punishment 
for the slave owners who had turned their backs on the Union by seceding. Amos W. Hostetter, 
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of the 34th Illinois, wrote to a Mr. and Mrs. O.P. Miles from a camp near Murfreesboro, 
Tennessee, in January of 1863, relating to them his changed view on emancipation: 
When I came into the service myself and many others did not believe in interfering with 
slavery but we have changed our opinions. We like the Negro no better now than we did 
then but we hate his masters worse and I tell you when Old Abe carries out his 
Proclamation he kills this Rebellion and not before. I am henceforth an Abolitionist and I 
intend to practice what I preach.44 
 
Hostetter implies that the Confederacy will collapse without the help of their slave labor, 
and that he sees the Emancipation Proclamation as a tool to do exactly that. It speaks volumes 
that he sees the same resolve in his comrades, as he relates earlier in the same letter “men that 
came here Strong Democrats are Democrats no longer, men who came here with no intention of 
interfering with Slavery are now abolitionists.”45 Another soldier, Robert B. Latham, of the 106th 
Illinois, wrote around this very same time that he felt the Emancipation Proclamation was “The 
way to put down the rebellion, and end the war.”46 Captain William P. Black, of the 37th Illinois, 
reacted to the Proclamation on January 3rd, 1863, stating, “we are now able to inflict so much the 
greater injury on rebels by the terms of the President’s glorious Emancipation Proclamation.”47 
However, it is worth noting that of these three soldiers, only Hostetter relates his view of 
emancipation to his view of Lincoln and his chances of reelection. 
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Hostetter’s letter gives some evidence of the switch in philosophy concerning 
emancipation that Union soldiers experienced. While Jonathan W. White argues that many 
Union soldiers did not experience a conversion to abolitionism, there is some evidence that some 
Union soldiers did. John C. Dinsmore, of the 99th Illinois, wrote to his brother on October 24th, 
1862, of the opinions in the army on Lincoln’s preliminary Emancipation Proclamation. He 
related the news that “there is very few soldiers that is against it,” and says that he would not be 
surprised if his brother’s regiment and most of the soldiers in it did not approve of the measure 
within six months in the service.48 Dinsmore argues that he does not believe “the ware will come 
to a Close while the negroes is left wheare they are to rais suplies for the rebel army.”49 
Hostetter also tells his family members that if they have the right to vote for president in 
1864, that they would undoubtedly go all in for Lincoln. However, he states that this would only 
happen “if Old Abe carries out what he has commenced.”50 Among the many soldiers’ letters and 
diaries consulted here, Hostetter’s account is only one among a few who explicitly connect the 
policy of emancipation with support for Lincoln’s reelection. This is significant, as the 
ideological connection between emancipation and reelection is often tenuous at best when it 
concerns soldiers and their writings. For this reason it is a tough sell to argue that Union soldiers 
voted for Lincoln because of his stance on slavery and emancipation. In this regard, the work of 
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Jonathan W. White holds up against the likes of James M. McPherson, Chandra Manning, and 
Jennifer L. Weber, who emphasize that soldiers made their choice based on Lincoln’s handling 
of emancipation in the Civil War. 
Some soldiers who may have held a negative view of the emancipation issue or of the 
changes in race relations that the war seemed to cause even found themselves in favor of 
Lincoln’s reelection. Take George F. Miller of the 2nd Illinois Cavalry, for instance. In a diary 
entry dated November 8th, 1864, election day, he writes, “Well this is Election day but we Ills. 
Soldiers are not allowed a vote: we are on equality with the Negro now; I would like to be at 
home long enough to vote! This is the 4th president I have voted for; but; I did not vote this 
time!! … I do sincerely hope it is Abe Lincoln!!”51 While Miller makes more of a statement 
against the treatment of soldiers in respects to voting in the election, he does not fault Lincoln 
with his being on par “with the Negro now.”52 Another soldier, Colonel Theodore Lyman, of 
General George Meade’s staff, related the news of Lincoln’s reelection positively while at the 
same time hoping that the significant political opposition would temper Lincoln’s actions in his 
second term. Lyman writes, “This will caution him, or better, his party, to proceed cautiously and 
to make no fanatical experiments, such as we too often have seen, but to proceed firmly, and 
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according to rule and law.”53 While Lyman finds Lincoln to be the correct choice for president, 
he seems to express indignation at past actions taken by his administration. The quote implies 
actions that were taken in spite of “rule and law,” which by the Democratic opposition would 
mean either action taken against civil liberties or of emancipation. 
Soldiers undoubtedly thought about emancipation during the course of the election. This 
was an issue that obviously incited much passion since its introduction into the national political 
consciousness, and soldiers’ relative silence on the issue in favor of other topics during the 
election may speak to its relative unimportance in their decision-making. However, what the 
soldiers did say on the topic of slavery rarely deviated from the mainstream Republican Party 
message: that slavery was the cause of the war and must be gotten rid of in order to repair the 
Union, and so emancipation was a necessary war measure taken to ultimately win the war. 
Any attempts to pigeon hole the message of a nineteenth century political party in the 
midst of an electoral campaign is a monumental task. It must be remembered that Abraham 
Lincoln’s nomination in June 1864 was not inevitable in the midst of an increasingly unpopular 
war and the disappointment of a military stalemate in Virginia in the spring of 1864. Historian 
William Frank Zornow, as well as many historians since, described the political climate within 
the Republican Party at length. Factions of the party, most notably the Radicals, were decidedly 
uninspired by the prospect of four more years of Lincoln and consequently the presidential 
stocks of fellow Republicans such as John C. Frémont and Salmon P. Chase rose during this 
process. Due to this factionalism, it is difficult to nail down a single party line on any one issue, 
especially emancipation. 
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However, for the purposes of this study, it is only necessary to attempt to give a cursory 
glance at the materials that likely passed before soldiers’ eyes during the course of the 1864 
campaign. Among these were political pamphlets and newspapers. Perhaps the most crucial 
campaign literature to reach the front were those published by the Union League and the Loyal 
Publication Society. James M. McPherson notes that these political societies were created in 
opposition to political societies formed at the time by the Democratic Party, and thus became “an 
auxiliary of the Republican party.”54 Thus, the pamphlets published by these societies should be 
seen as near to official campaign literature as possible given the time period. It should also be 
noted that the Loyal Publication Society’s resolution, as adopted at its first meeting in February 
of 1863, stated: 
Resolved, that the object of this organization is, and shall be confined to the distribution 
of Journals and Documents of unquestionable and unconditional loyalty throughout the 
United States, and particularly in the Armies now engaged in the suppression of the 
Rebellion, and to counteract, as far as practicable, the efforts now being made by the 
enemies of the Government and the advocates of a disgraceful peace to circulate journals 
and documents of a disloyal character.55 
 
 First and foremost, the language of this resolution, as well as the society’s name, directly 
attacks the opposition societies as disloyal and traitorous. This was an integral aspect of the 
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Republican Party’s strategy as it relates to the opinions expressed by Union soldiers, and will be 
discussed in the next chapter. For the purposes of this chapter, the above passage’s importance 
lies in the Loyal Publication Society’s intent to distribute campaign literature to the soldiers on 
the front. This information makes it necessary for one to analyze the opinions expressed 
concerning emancipation within their pages and compare it to what is seen in soldiers’ letters and 
diaries. 
 Upon analysis, the opinions expressed and promoted by these political societies through 
their pamphlets is not far from the pragmatic outlook on emancipation seen in the soldiers’ own 
words. These “auxiliary” components of the Republican Party encouraged emancipation to be 
seen as a necessary move toward finishing up the Civil War. It is not unlikely that the soldiers 
read the words of pamphlets such as these, since historians like Joseph Allen Frank and James 
M. McPherson contend that soldiers were politically knowledgeable and often anxious for news 
from other fronts as well as from home.56 
 Pamphlets produced by these political societies addressed the emancipation issue with a 
decidedly pragmatic and conservative approach. They were published by more moderate 
elements of the party and as such, these publications stayed away from moral arguments against 
slavery then favored by the more radical wing of the Republican Party. Rather, the pamphlets 
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promoted the contention that emancipation was a necessary measure toward ensuring victory. A 
decent example of this message is contained in a speech published and distributed by the Loyal 
Publication Society entitled “Rebellion, Slavery, and Peace.” The speech, given by an N.G. 
Upham, upholds the actions taken by the U.S. government regarding slavery and emancipation. 
Among the actions Upham recognizes are the seizure of Confederate contraband of war, 
including slaves. Concerning the Emancipation Proclamation, Upham reinforces the contention 
that it was first and foremost a war measure, and forcefully states that Lincoln, in issuing the 
Proclamation, was merely reacting against a hostile South bent upon sundering the Union in 
order to save slavery. Upham concludes this portion of his speech by arguing that while the value 
of slavery could be calculated, the value of the Union could not.57 
 Importantly, Upham also evaluates the constitutionality of the Emancipation 
Proclamation. He mentions a vague “charge of unconstitutionality” before weighing in on the 
issue, ultimately finding that the president’s war powers as commander-in-chief allow him 
discretion in this sphere.58 The issue of constitutionality is also addressed in another Loyal 
Publication Society publication entitled, “The Constitution Vindicated. Nationality, Secession, 
Slavery.” The pamphlet, a published form of a speech by a James A. Hamilton, concludes that 
the Emancipation Proclamation and any actions taken by Congress to deprive the enemy of their 
war-making property are fully condoned by the Constitution.59 
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 The Union League also approached the issue of emancipation in a pragmatic way, 
arguing that slavery caused the war and that its eradication was a military necessity. An essay 
written anonymously and published by the Union League of Philadelphia in March 1864 detailed 
the reasons Lincoln should be reelected to the presidential chair. The essay points out Lincoln’s 
single-minded determination to “the one thought which engrosses every true American heart – 
the re-establishment of the Union on a permanent basis.”60 Going further, the essay argues that 
reunion is the sole purpose of Lincoln’s conduct of the war with all other considerations being 
secondary, including slavery. However, slavery became an “obstacle” to reunion and in this light 
Lincoln’s Proclamation was issued. The author continues, 
We found that slavery was not only the cause of the rebellion, but that, in place of being, 
as we had supposed, an inherent weakness, it was really a source of strength. Its 
destruction became, therefore, necessary to the overthrow of the rebel chiefs, and also to 
the permanency of the triumph of the national cause. This last consideration, however, 
was slowly reached, and the Emancipation Proclamation was issued solely as a military 
measure.61 
  
This passage mirrors the arguments seen in soldiers’ correspondence concerning the issue of 
emancipation. The author argues that not only was slavery the cause of the war, but it was also 
the hindrance to a lasting peace.62 
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 Finally, some Union campaign pamphlets sought to place the emancipation into a 
historical context. In two pamphlets published by the Loyal Publication Society, the precedents 
are shown for the policy of emancipation. These publications, especially an anonymously written 
essay on the opinions of the Founding Fathers in regards to slavery, make an explicit effort to 
ground the eradication of slavery into the founding of the United States. The implication is quite 
clear: that Abraham Lincoln is merely following in the footsteps of his forebears, including 
George Washington, John Adams, Patrick Henry, and Benjamin Franklin.63 The Loyal 
Publication Society also published an April 8th, 1864 speech given in the U.S Senate by Senator 
Charles Sumner of Massachusetts in which Sumner argues that the abolition of slavery is 
sanctioned by the Constitution as well as in the words of the Founders.64 While these arguments 
do not show up in the words of the soldiers themselves, they may very well have served to sway 
some who were indecisive on Lincoln due to emancipation’s position in his party’s platform. 
 The approved platform consisted of eleven resolutions, two of which dealt with slavery in 
some fashion. The third resolution called for a constitutional amendment abolishing slavery 
throughout the United States, as it was the cause of the war, aided the Confederate war efforts, 
and “hostile to the principles of Republican Government.” The resolution continued by renewing 
support for Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation, and calling for the aforementioned 
amendment to “forever prohibit the existence of slavery within the limits or the jurisdiction of 
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the United States.”65 In the fifth resolution, the approved platform gives its support to Lincoln 
specifically and endorses his actions, including the Emancipation Proclamation and the 
enlistment of freedmen as soldiers.66 Lincoln accepted the nomination of his party and explicitly 
reaffirmed his commitment to abolishing slavery by constitutional amendment. The platform, as 
well as Lincoln’s acceptance letter, appeared in the New York Tribune and were likely printed in 
other newspapers throughout the North. Soldiers, who thirsted for news from the home front, 
very likely saw the platform of the Republican Party, yet there is very little discussion of the 
platform one way or another among the soldiers researched here. 
 Lincoln made one other statement on emancipation and slavery that was widely printed 
throughout the North: the “Conkling Letter,” written by Lincoln in response to an invitation to 
visit Springfield, Illinois in the late summer of 1863. Lincoln’s friend, James C. Conkling, 
became increasingly worried about Republican electoral prospects in Illinois due to the issues of 
emancipation and the arming of black soldiers. Lincoln’s response reinforced his argument that 
the Emancipation Proclamation was issued as a tool to save the Union: 
You say you will not fight to free negroes. Some of them seem willing to fight for you; 
but, no matter. Fight you, then, exclusively to save the Union. I issued the proclamation 
on purpose to aid you in saving the Union. Whenever you shall have conquered all 
resistance to the Union, if I shall urge you to continue fighting, it will be an apt time, 
then, for you to declare you will not fight to free negroes. 
 I thought that in your struggle for the Union, to whatever extent the negroes 
should cease helping the enemy, to that extent it weakened the enemy in his resistance to 
you. Do you think differently? I thought that whatever negroes can be got to do as 
soldiers, leaves just so much less for white soldiers to do, in saving the Union. Does it 
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appear otherwise to you? But negroes, like other people, act upon motives. Why should 
they do anything for us, if we will do nothing for them? If they stake their lives for us, 
they must be prompted by the strongest motive – even the promise of freedom. And the 
promise being made, must be kept.67 
 
Lincoln addresses those who believed that the war’s focus had changed by refuting that 
notion. Instead of a war being fought to free the slaves, it was still a war to save the Union. 
Lincoln speaks in unconditional terms that the Emancipation Proclamation was issued in order to 
help save the Union. He then proceeds into pragmatic waters, arguing that any labor the 
Confederacy loses by emancipation, the Union will undoubtedly benefit from. From this point, 
Lincoln gives a cursory update on the progress of the war, concluding, “Peace does not appear so 
distant as it did.”68 While speaking of peace, he strays into a philosophical analysis of the war’s 
purpose upon its hypothetical conclusion, hoping “it will then be proved that, among free men, 
there can be no successful appeal from the ballot to the bullet.”69 Lincoln is of course relating his 
view of the coming of the war: an electoral dispute wherein one section of the country refused to 
acknowledge their constitutionally elected President, then resorting to violence. Lincoln 
ultimately concludes the “Conkling Letter” with some of the most forceful language contained 
within the document: 
And then, there will be some black men who can remember that, with silent tongue, and 
clenched teeth, and steady eye, and well-poised bayonet, they have helped mankind on to 
this great consummation; while, I fear, there will be some white ones, unable to forget 
that, with malignant heart, and deceitful speech, they have strove to hinder it.70 
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Here, at the end of the document, Lincoln takes the moral high ground. He predicts the efforts 
and successes of the black troops in defeating the Confederacy while warning the opponents of 
his emancipation policy of the possible lasting personal effects of their disruptiveness. 
The effects of Lincoln’s “Conkling Letter” are difficult to gauge as it relates to Union 
soldiers and their eventual electoral support of Lincoln’s reelection. However, historian Michael 
Burlingame notes that this particular letter was discussed throughout the country by the major 
national and regional newspapers, including the Chicago Tribune, the New York Times, and the 
New York Evening Post.71 Given that Union soldiers hungered for news from home and thirsted 
for political news, it is likely that they read reprints of the letter or, at the very least, political 
commentary on its contents. The contents of Lincoln’s letter definitely align with the mainline 
thought of the Republican Party concerning emancipation, which matches the reasons the 
soldiers supported it. As has been said before, the soldiers’ virtual silence on the issue during the 
election likely amounted to tacit support. 
Very few of the soldiers in this study gave an opinion on slavery or emancipation at all 
specifically during the 1864 presidential election campaign. It is more likely that Union soldiers 
tacitly approved of Lincoln’s handling of the emancipation issue, while saving their energy for a 
more demanding issue featured in the election of 1864: that of treason and disloyalty to the 
Union. This issue of disloyalty inspired much more emotionally charged language in Union 
soldiers and is much more likely to have inspired them to cast their votes for Abraham Lincoln. 
Even though these Union soldiers believed that emancipation was a necessary tool in 
eventually winning the war, there is little indication that the emancipation issue loomed largely 
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in the minds of soldiers when deciding whom to vote for in 1864. However, it is important to 
note that those who did mention it rarely strayed far from the Republican Party line. The issue 
that dominated the hearts and minds of Union soldiers throughout the summer and fall of 1864 
was what I refer to as the “disloyalty issue.” 
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Chapter 2 –  “Soldiers don’t generally believe in fighting to put 
down treason, and voting to let it live:” The Disloyalty Issue and the 
Soldier Vote 
 On November 9th, 1864, the day after the presidential election, a private from Vermont by 
the name of Wilbur Fisk wrote, “Soldiers don’t generally believe in fighting to put down treason, 
and voting to let it live.”72 Although simply stated, this sentiment likely rang true for a great 
many soldiers in the fall of 1864 and was perhaps the primary factor in determining whom one 
would cast a ballot for in the presidential election. Unlike the already discussed issue of 
emancipation, the issue of disloyalty inspired far more deliberation throughout the pages of 
soldiers’ letters and diaries in the months leading up to the pivotal election. Broadly speaking, 
the disloyalty issue encompassed the soldiers’ conception of the Democratic Party in the North, 
particularly the peace faction within its ranks. The Peace Democrats were commonly referred to 
as Copperheads. 
 For the purposes of this study, the Copperheads need only be defined by their opposition 
to the Lincoln administration’s war policies, which included emancipation, the draft, demands 
for an unconditional surrender, full restoration of the Union upon cessation of hostilities, and 
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. Rather, as historian Jennifer L. Weber points out, the 
Copperheads demanded “an immediate peace settlement… they were willing to trade victory for 
peace.”73 This characteristic of the antiwar wing of the Democratic Party encouraged Union 
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soldiers to vote for Lincoln. The soldiers’ reasoning included opposition to the idea of peace at 
any cost, as such a peace could only be temporary. Soldiers also wanted their fallen comrades’ 
sacrifices to not have been made in vain, and so actively supported Lincoln’s intention to follow 
through with the war until total victory could be achieved. Total victory here would include the 
restoration of the Union, the primary goal of the Union’s efforts since the firing upon Fort 
Sumter in April of 1861. Lastly, a large majority of Union troops found the Copperheads to be 
downright treasonous in their opposition to the war. 
 Historians have accounted for the emotions that Copperheads inspired in the ranks of 
Union soldiers, and several have extended their findings to the soldiers’ decision to vote for 
Abraham Lincoln in 1864. William Frank Zornow, in Lincoln and the Party Divided, published 
in 1954, traces the development of what he terms the “domestic treason issue.”74 Zornow argues 
that Republican leadership deliberately pushed the issue in order to stigmatize the Democratic 
Party, which became a particularly effective electioneering tactic. By the end of the political 
canvass, after “Republican syllogisms constructed around the words Copperhead, Democrat, 
traitor, and rebel were presented ad nauseum,” the Republicans were electorally successful.75 
Zornow concludes that while the treason issue was decisive in the presidential election, it was an 
unfair charge against the Democrats, as very few of them harbored any ill will towards the 
government and alleged Copperhead conspiracies, such as one plan to liberate Confederate 
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prisoners of war in Indiana, were overstated.76 Jennifer L. Weber, in Copperheads: The Rise and 
Fall of Lincoln’s Opponents in the North, argues that these conspiracies have been erroneously 
focused upon. She disagrees with historian Frank L. Klement, who argued in The Copperheads 
in the Middle West that the Copperheads as a significant political threat were largely a fictional 
“product of fevered Republican imaginations.”77 Instead, Weber finds that the Copperheads were 
not merely a group on the fringe of Democratic Party politics, but were in fact a broadly based 
group whose ideas threatened to take over the reins of the party’s national message. While 
Weber’s assertion has merit, especially since the peace wing of the Democratic Party was able to 
secure their own platform as well as notable Copperhead George H. Pendleton as the vice 
presidential candidate, it is important to note that it was indeed Republican strategy to paint the 
Copperheads as disloyal and treasonous. This was a perception that Union soldiers readily 
accepted. 
 As far as the Copperheads’ effect on the opinions of Union soldiers as it related to the 
presidential election, historians have not been silent. Zornow does not specifically mention the 
effects the attacks on Copperheads by the Republican campaign had on the Union army, but 
Weber certainly does. She argues that Union soldiers became more politicized between the 
issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation and the presidential election in 1864 in part because 
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of the Copperhead presence, which resulted in “unqualified support of Lincoln.”78 This 
statement, along with her other assertion that the soldiers became “lifelong Republicans” due to 
Copperhead activity, are most troublesome. The trouble with these two assertions is that they are 
largely unqualified. The latter is particularly so, given the monumental task it would take to 
prove the thesis correct. Weber’s assertion, along with James M. McPherson’s previously 
discussed assertion that the army’s overwhelming support for Lincoln gives a “pretty fair 
indication of army sentiment on slavery,” provides the impetus for Jonathan W. White’s 
argument in Emancipation, The Union Army, and the Reelection of Abraham Lincoln.79 White’s 
is the most recently published work on the election of 1864 and the only book length project to 
deal with the soldier’s role within the election. White’s main bone of contention is emancipation 
as it relates to the soldier’s decision to cast a vote for Lincoln as well as whether the soldier vote 
indicated an authentic identification with the Republican Party. White gives a number of other 
reasons soldiers, of both Republican and Democratic persuasions, voted for Lincoln. These 
reasons, including opposition to Copperheads, are given to show that soldiers thought about 
much more than emancipation during the course of the election. These alternate motives are 
given by White to show that the results of the soldier vote had little to do with loyalty to the 
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Republican Party. White concludes, arguing that the results of the soldier vote “was not an 
overarching change in ideology or political sentiment.”80 However, this argument is flawed. 
 Many soldiers may not have mentioned their stance on emancipation during the run-up to 
the presidential election, but a great number of them had a lot to say about their reasons for not 
supporting the Democratic Party. This anti-Copperhead stance should not be viewed as 
apolitical, but instead as a clear endorsement of Lincoln and his party. After all, the Republican 
platform mirrors the very message that most soldiers who wrote about Copperheads adhered to:  
Resolved, That we approve the determination of the Government of the United States not 
to compromise with Rebels, or to offer them any terms of peace, except such as may be 
based upon an unconditional surrender of their hostility and a return to their just 
allegiance to the Constitution and laws of the United States, and that we call upon the 
Government to maintain this position, and to prosecute the war with the utmost possible 
vigor to complete the suppression of the Rebellion, in full reliance upon the self-
sacrificing patriotism, the heroic valor, and the undying devotion of the American people 
to their country and its free institutions.81 
  
Indeed, a great many Union soldiers expressed their wish that the war continue on until total 
victory could be achieved. This sentiment is perhaps the most common among soldiers who 
seemingly voted for Lincoln because they could not bring themselves to support a party that 
seemed to argue for peace at any cost. Thus, the anti-Copperhead stance of Union soldiers and 
the subsequent soldier vote was decidedly political in nature and represents support for the 
party’s platform and ideology as expressed in the fall of 1864. 
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 Not only did the Republican platform call for an unconditional surrender and restoration 
of the Union, but the leaders of the Republican Party also actively campaigned against the 
Copperheads’ own message as expressed within their platform. Within the pages of newspapers 
and campaign pamphlets across the country, Republicans lambasted the Democrats’ message. 
For instance, a pamphlet published by the National Union Executive Committee (remember that 
the Republican Party campaigned as the National Union Party in 1864) breaks down the 
differences, as they saw them, between the Democrats’ platform and their own. The subtitle of 
the pamphlet sums up the message of the whole document: “How shall we end the Rebellion – 
Shall we Coax it, or Crush it?”82 The document answers this question with a call for victory 
through the force of arms: “If we surrender to the rebellion, the Union is gone forever. If we fight 
the Rebels a little longer, it is safe forever. If we give them to understand, in November next, that 
the only Road to Peace lies through the Victory of the National arms, the contest if over!”83 
Other pamphlets echo the same message. 
 In another pamphlet published by the very same National Union Executive Committee, 
the authors show further reasoning as to why sticking with Abraham Lincoln would be the 
correct choice in November 1864. This pamphlet, entitled “What Jeff. Davis Thinks Of The 
War,” gives excerpts from two speeches made by Confederate President Jefferson Davis in 
which he discusses the need for reinforcements and for any deserters to return to the front. The 
author of the pamphlet points out that this entreaty is at odds with the message that the 
Democrats present in their platform: “Does that look as if the war had been a failure on our 
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part?”84 The pamphlet closes much the same as the first, entreating voters who agree that the war 
must be fought on to ultimate victory to vote for Lincoln.  
 In a pamphlet published by the Union Congressional Committee, the author specifically 
addresses the soldiers in the Union armies regarding the Democratic platform:  
Men of the North! Soldiers of the Republic! Do you want such a peace? Are you willing 
that all your heroic devotion to liberty, and the Union, should result only in this 
temporary peace? If you want a peace worth having, one that will be permanent, a peace 
that comes to you unstained with national dishonor, then you will trample under your feet 
this proposition for a “temporary peace,” which comes to you with the nomination of 
McClellan.85 
 
This quote cements the political message of the Republican Party during the electoral 
campaign of 1864: to vote for Abraham Lincoln if one wishes for an honorable peace gained via 
military victory in the field. As the soldiers’ letters attest, this issue fired up the members who 
would contribute to the soldier vote much more than any other single issue. It is due to these 
political pamphlets that the soldiers’ vocal support of Republican war aims becomes an essential 
component of the soldiers’ political ideology in 1864. The soldier vote very much signified 
political support and loyalty to the Republicans’ message. 
While the Democratic platform passed at Chicago called for a convention of sorts to be 
held in order to return the states to their practical places within the Union, the manner in which it 
did so irked Republicans and soldiers alike. The platform, as the soldiers attest in their letters, 
seemed to describe the war as an abject failure. The Democratic platform stated, 
Resolved, That this convention does explicitly declare, as the sense of the American 
people, that after four years of failure to restore the Union by the experiment of war, 
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during which, under the pretense of military necessity of war-power higher than the 
Constitution, the Constitution itself has been disregarded in every part, and public liberty 
and private right alike trodden down… demand that immediate efforts be made for a 
cessation of hostilities, with a view of an ultimate convention of the States, or other 
peaceable means, to the end that, at the earliest practicable moment, peace may be 
restored on the basis of the Federal Union of the States.86 
 
This passage from the Democratic platform argues three points, all of which are connected. First, 
the resolution describes the war efforts as a failure. This argument was passed on by both 
publishers friendly to the Lincoln Administration as well as Republican leadership in order to 
sow seeds of discontent among potential voters, many of whom, especially the soldiers, already 
viewed the Democrats as a traitorous crowd.87 Second, the resolution alludes to the use of war 
powers by the Lincoln Administration, undoubtedly including the suspension of the writ of 
habeas corpus, emancipation, and the draft. Due to the research of historian William C. Davis, it 
is generally acknowledged that soldiers’ support of Lincoln as a person and figure extended to 
each of his then controversial policies.88 Thus, it is likely that this attack on the administration 
did not convert many soldiers to the Democratic cause. Third, the resolution calls for suspension 
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of hostilities as soon as possible. The soldiers translated this call for an immediate peace as 
surrender to the Confederacy and a peace without victory. Many soldiers felt that this peace 
would not last, and would not be worth the effort. 
As we shall see, many soldiers discussed these very ideas in their letters and diaries and 
this was a major issue in the election cycle. Soldiers thought that concluding the war without 
victory would make their fallen comrades’ sacrifices, as well as their own, to have been in vain. 
Soldiers saw this aspect of the Democratic platform as treasonous. It did not likely help the 
Democratic cause that its nominee, following the fall of Atlanta, accepted his nomination for 
president while at the same time distancing himself from the “war failure” plank present on the 
platform. Indeed, George B. McClellan wrote that when “our present adversaries are ready for 
peace, on the basis of the Union,” then a conversation on peace would be acceptable.89 
McClellan thus shied away from his party’s platform and in so doing, forced the Democrats into 
an awkward position, torn between the conflicting principles of war and peace. This likely did 
not inspire trust on the part of soldiers voting for president. 
Union soldiers expressed their dislike for Copperheads on numerous occasions 
throughout the course of the war. Of all the aspects of the Northern political landscape, the issue 
of what they deemed disloyal attracted their attention most. This became especially true in the 
summer and fall of 1864, during the lead-up to the presidential election. The soldiers expressed 
their displeasure with the Copperhead platform of the Democratic Party in ways that showed 
their commitment to the message of the Republican Party platform. This indicates a level of 
commitment to Republican political ideology, at least during the latter months of the Civil War. 
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The soldiers based their support of Abraham Lincoln on what they believed he stood for 
in 1864: a continuation of the war until total military victory could be achieved, which would 
then lead to a permanent peace and the restoration of their beloved Union. At times, their 
language did not necessarily express support for Lincoln, but rather opposition to his electoral 
opponents. Due to this nature of the Republican Party’s campaign, this is not simply a vote 
against the Democrats rather than support for the Republicans as Jonathan W. White suggests.90 
The Republican campaign made disloyalty an issue, and the soldiers’ voices should be seen in 
this light and thus as an expression of ideological commitment. Those few who disagreed with 
Lincoln’s politics but could not bring themselves to vote for the Copperheads made their 
opinions absolutely clear through their letters and diaries. 
Many Union soldiers felt as Private Wilbur Fisk did in the fall of 1864; Lincoln was the 
candidate the country needed to see the war through to its successful conclusion. Fisk stated, 
They know Mr. Lincoln’s straightforward iron determination to punish treason 
everywhere and do it thoroughly, and they know that he will not spare their pride, nor 
buy them off, nor surrender one iota of the principles that he has avowed.91 
 
Fisk suggests that his own support for Lincoln’s reelection is based on Lincoln’s 
principles, namely not to “surrender” and “to punish treason everywhere.” The latter is the first 
trend that can be seen in soldiers’ letters and diaries in discussion of Lincoln and the election in 
the summer and fall of 1864. This trend, broadly speaking, is to identify opposition to Lincoln as 
treason and disloyalty. Soldiers oftentimes disparaged anybody they deemed disloyal. 
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Soldiers often identified the two players in the electoral campaign in simple and 
unmistakable terms. They often believed that loyalty meant support for Lincoln while support for 
McClellan and the Democrats was both disloyal and treasonous. For example, John Anderson of 
the Independent Pennsylvania Battery E, very simply identified the army as “loyal,” which 
translated to “very few votes here for McClellan.”92 Furthermore, Anderson states his impression 
that the army was loyal “almost to a man and a Copperhead in the army is a very scard reptile.”93 
Other soldiers were even less sophisticated in their criticisms of the Democratic Party. John C. 
Baum of the 42nd Ohio recorded election results from his regiment on November 9, 1864. Of 198 
votes cast in the regiment, “seven for the traitor two in our company.”94 
The issue of loyalty versus disloyalty inspired a great deal of emotional reaction from 
Union soldiers. This becomes evident in their letters and diaries. A Richard H. Watson of the 36th 
Illinois expressed a wish concerning the election results in the coming presidential election: “Oh 
that we had every Traitor North by the neck. I would shoot Vallandigham with as little 
compunctions of conscience as I would a serpent.”95 Another soldier, Hosea Smith of the 8th 
New Hampshire, expressed similar wishes in an October 11, 1864 letter: “This war is destined to 
close up, if not in every respect as some of us would have it but with the Union restored and 
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rebels and traitors both North and South made to bite the dust.”96 The issue of how the war 
would terminate dominated soldiers’ discussions of the election, especially as it became more 
and more apparent that the election was shaping up to be a referendum on the war itself. 
Union soldiers voted for Lincoln in 1864 because for two primary reasons related to the 
disloyalty issue. The first reason revolved around the fact that Lincoln stood for total military 
victory. Soldiers felt that such a victory would ensure that their sacrifices had not been made in 
vain, and would also result in a lasting peace. The second reason is closely related to the first in 
that they could not stomach voting for the Democrats due to their platform, which they felt called 
for an armistice. 
The succinct quote that opened this chapter is a good way to begin discussion of the 
disloyalty issue within the letters and diaries of the soldiers. As Wilbur Fisk stated in a letter 
written on November 9, 1864, “Soldiers don’t generally believe in fighting to put down treason, 
and voting to let it live.”97 This frank observation serves to characterize the way soldiers viewed 
the two sides of the electoral conflict. Soldiers believed that Republicans stood for continuing the 
war until total victory and chose to support them because of this belief. George M. Gilchrist, of 
Indiana, wrote on September 20, 1864 that he supported Lincoln’s reelection because he stood 
staunchly against “treason” and “because I think his election will do more to crush out this 
rebellion than anything outside shot and shell… I am opposed to bringing about peace until we 
have whipped the rebels and brought them back into our union.”98 Lieutenant Joseph Ferguson of 
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the 7th U.S. Colored Infantry believed that the election results meant “a firm prosecution of the 
war until the Union is restored.”99  
The disloyalty issue within the soldier vote, as well as the components of it, is 
inextricably linked to the ideology of the Republican Party in 1864, as expressed in the party’s 
adopted platform. Each component of the issue is explicitly laid out in the campaign literature of 
the time, and so the parallels in the writing of Union soldiers on the subject are an indication of 
their political commitment to Lincoln and the Republicans, at least in 1864. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, the Republicans did not focus their campaign on emancipation, but on the 
winning of the war. They campaigned on fighting until military victory could be achieved, at 
which point the Union could be restored. They campaigned against the Copperhead peace 
platform of the Democratic Party, arguing that peace without victory was not worthy of the 
country’s sacrifice thus far. Each of these issues is related in Union soldiers’ writings. 
Union soldiers often identified those they found disloyal and the issue of treason 
occupied their interest immensely in the months leading up to the presidential election. William 
Dillon of Illinois is fairly representative of the research: he expressed fears of “an outburst of an 
unfavorable character among the belligerents at home to the Administration, the war-policy, and 
to the support and encouragement of the army.”100 Dillon here makes a connection that is seen in 
many soldiers’ writings: the connection between the Lincoln administration and the war policy. 
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He also implies that any opposition to either would indicate a lack of support for the Union army. 
For some soldiers, the specter of disloyalty at home inspired their deepest resentments. These 
soldiers expressed wishes to shoot these Northern traitors either after, or instead of, defeating 
their Southern Confederate foes. Richard H. Watson, of the 36th Illinois, wrote, “Oh that we had 
every Traitor North by the neck. I would shoot Vallandigham with as little compunctions of 
conscience as I would a Serpent.”101 Austin J. Kendall of the 117th New York Infantry expressed 
his wish to fight Copperheads as well. Kendall wrote on November 10, 1864 concerning his wish 
to be sent north for the remainder of the war to fight the “cowardly copperheads.”102 Union 
soldiers were clearly incensed at the very thought of dissension in the North, and wished very 
much to quell these voices. 
Union soldiers may have wished to quiet the voices of dissent at home because they felt 
that the North needed to convey an image of unison in order to dissuade the South from fighting 
on much longer after the potential reelection of Lincoln. William M. Martindell of the 119th 
Pennsylvania expressed this very sentiment: “I think his reelection will do more to end the war 
than anything else, for the rebles will see that the north are determined to carry the war on and 
restore the union.”103 Another soldier, Warren S. Heald, believed that Lincoln’s reelection would 
force the Confederacy to recognize that it had been defeated. He wrote, “When Lincoln is 
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Relected the Ware will be over they are Whiped and only hold out for a compromise that they 
never can have… when the South see that the North will stick to one another they will give 
up.”104 This view was perhaps naïve but it indicates what soldiers thought the election of Lincoln 
could accomplish. 
As discussed above, the soldiers’ malignity for Copperheads stemmed from their calls for 
peace at seemingly any cost. This general malign translated into staunch support for the Lincoln 
– Johnson ticket. There are several ideological strands distinguishable within this anti-
Copperhead position. For one, without a military victory, the Union soldiers worried that the 
Union would be lost. Second, soldiers did not want their efforts and sacrifices to save the union 
to have been in vain. Third, soldiers thought that peace gained by military victory would be long 
lasting, rather than of a short duration borne from an armistice. It is for these reasons that Union 
soldiers could not support the Democratic Party in 1864. The presence of the aforementioned 
Chicago Platform and the “peace plank” within it all but ensured that the soldiers would align 
themselves ideologically with Lincoln and the Republicans. 
Peace granted by complete military success was most desirable to soldiers in part because 
of the beliefs they held on the nature of union. Americans in the 1860s held certain beliefs about 
America that today might seem foreign and “vaguely embarrassing if not mock-heroic.”105 
Historian James M. McPherson explains that the concept of union held “transcendent values” 
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that made it amount to an almost religion.106 So what was union? The concept of union dealt with 
a vision of America’s place in the history of the world: as the first state in history to survive as a 
government based on majority rule. The Confederate states’ action in dissolving the union in 
reaction to national electoral results threatened the very survival of the American experiment. 
Lincoln, of course, gave voice to these concepts in his seminal Gettysburg Address. The union 
was also thought to be endowed with the American Revolution’s core values of liberty and so its 
granting of freedom and liberty could not be torn apart so easily. 
The research supports the contention that many soldiers who favored the reelection of 
Abraham Lincoln felt that he best represented the cause of union. Soldiers wanted peace, but 
only a peace that would come with the union restored. Soldier Hosea Smith firmly believed that 
the war was “destined to close up, if not in every respect as some of us would have it but with the 
Union restored.”107 Another, George Gilchrist, refused to give up the fight until Southern states 
then in rebellion were “back into our Union.”108 William B. Gates of the 3rd Ohio Cavalry wrote 
his own retort to hypothetical Copperheads who asked, “When will this war be over?” 
Not until every white livered traitor in shape of human flesh and blood, both north and 
south should be wiped out of existence and from the face of our once happy, prosperous 
and united country, second to none beneath heaven.109 
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This quote answers to a few characteristics Union soldiers had when discussing the coming 
election. One is the already-mentioned idea that the war would cease when all traitors were 
silenced and another is the contention that the United States was worth saving. The concept of 
union undoubtedly fueled Gates’ assertion that the county was “second to none beneath heaven.” 
Soldiers’ acceptance and support of the ideology of American exceptionalism was a contributing 
factor to their willingness to continue fighting the war and, consequently, their electoral support 
of Abraham Lincoln. 
 Part and parcel within the concept and ideology of union was the belief that in the United 
States, one could elevate their social status through hard work and determination. This was a 
concept that many Americans held dear, including soldiers. Union soldiers thought about what 
kind of country they wanted to leave to their children when making electoral decisions. Charles 
H. Smith is one example of this. He wrote to his wife, telling her, “If I fall it will be fighting for a 
government worth leaving for my children to live under.”110 Abraham Lincoln himself spoke 
along these lines directly to soldiers in the fall of 1864, possibly carrying influence in the 
election. After thanking the soldiers of the 166th Ohio, who were passing through the city of 
Washington on their way home, Lincoln impressed upon them his idea of what the war would 
decide: 
It is not merely for to-day, but for all time to come that we should perpetuate for our 
children’s children this great and free government, which we have enjoyed all our lives. I 
beg you to remember this, not merely for my sake, but for yours. I happen to temporarily 
occupy this big White House. I am a living witness that any one of your children may 
look to come here as my father’s child has. It is in order that each of you may have 
through this free government which we have enjoyed, an open field and a fair chance for 
your industry, enterprise and intelligence; that you may all have equal privileges in the 
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race of life, with all its desirable human aspirations. It is for this the struggle should be 
maintained, that we may not lose our birthright – not only for one, but for two or three 
years. The nation is worth fighting for, to secure such an inestimable jewel.111 
 
Lincoln urged that the war should continue simply because the country was worth saving. It was 
worth saving because of the concept of union. Within the union, a Midwestern farmer’s son 
could rise to become the political leader of the government. The freedom to rise above one’s 
inherited social status was only possible within the American experiment, if one was willing to 
work hard enough. Lincoln gave the same message to the 148th Ohio, who passed through 
Washington one day earlier, on August 21, 1864. Both speeches were reprinted in major 
newspapers across the North, spreading Lincoln’s conception of union and military victory far 
and wide. 
 It is no small thing then that Union soldiers who supported Lincoln’s bid for reelection 
mentioned their wish to fight on to victory in order to restore the union. This sentiment was not 
unconnected with their view of what the presidential election stood for. Instead, this sentiment 
indicated a major ideological commitment that signaled who the soldiers believed would protect 
the legacy of the American Revolution itself. 
  In addition to restoring the union, soldiers supporting Lincoln also wrote on their wish to 
fight on to ensure that their sacrifices would not have been made in vain. Campaign pamphlets 
supporting the Republicans brought out this issue in conjunction with the aforementioned issue 
of union. One such pamphlet addressed Union soldiers directly. In it, the Union Executive 
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Congressional Committee explained what they believed was at stake in the coming presidential 
election: 
If ever there was a time when Union bayonets were called on to think, it is now. The 
crisis of the war, when our armies have the rebellion in their grasp and are preparing to 
deal its death-blow, finds the country precipitated into the turmoil of a Presidential 
election. This election touches you, because in becoming soldiers you did not cease to be 
citizens; but it touches you even more closely than it does those of us who are merely 
citizens and not soldiers: for the issue is presented whether this war for the Union in 
which you are battling is a delusion and a mockery – whether the priceless blood shed 
shall go for no more than water spilt on the ground – whether you shall lay down your 
arms and sue rebels to make on their terms the peace you thought your valor had nearly 
won.112 
 
The message of this pamphlet was likely well received by Union soldiers, as some of their letters 
express this very sentiment. Warren S. Heald wrote on this matter, stating that “there has been to 
menny men killed and to menny Soljers still fiting to give up with out accomplish somthing.”113 
This sentiment is closely connected with the soldiers’ stance against ending the war prematurely 
without complete military victory. 
 This connection is shown explicitly in a letter written by a soldier who served in the 20th 
and 97th Pennsylvania Cavalry, Annesley N. Morton. He wrote on November 23, 1864 
concerning an acquaintance that sent him a Democratic newspaper. After reading the paper, 
Morton became offended at its use of the term “d__d Lincoln Hirelings” to describe Union 
soldiers. Morton warned that he and the acquaintance in question would surely fight it out when 
Morton returned home if talk turned to politics. He continued, writing: 
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I will not hear anybody run down that country that my dear Bro. Sketchie’s life was lost 
in assisting to save and what I have been over 3 years enduring the many hardships and 
dangers of a soldier’s life and d__n the man or woman who says what we all have done is 
a failure and I won’t listen to such talk.114 
 
Morton here refers to the aforementioned “war failure” plank of the Democratic Party and its 
relation to the sacrifices he and others had made in relation to the war. Morton’s outburst is 
overtly political in nature, as he cannot stomach the consequences of declaring the war a failure. 
These consequences include admission that his brother’s sacrifice had been made in vain. 
 This was not to be. Upon hearing the news of Lincoln’s reelection, soldier John Anderson 
reflected upon the meaning of the results for Union soldiers: 
It assures us that the sacrifices that the soldier has made, have not been in vain and that 
the war will continue until the parties who brought our present National Trouble upon us, 
will be compelled to submit to the law – and the cause of our troubles removed 
forever.115 
 
Thus, even after the election had been won, Anderson felt it important to mention that the 
soldiers’ sacrifices would not be made in vain. This idea is important to understanding why 
Union soldiers voted for Lincoln in 1864, and it is inextricably connected to the disloyalty issue 
and disgust of the Democratic Party. Anderson’s estimation of what the election results signified 
to the men around him is significant. It signaled firm prosecution of the war until victory, and a 
lasting peace, could be achieved. The latter idea is also integral to understanding the effect of the 
disloyalty issue on Union soldier voting patterns in 1864. 
 Union soldiers who supported Lincoln also desired that the war be concluded with a 
lasting peace. This issue is also tied to the concept of union. Soldiers wanted to save the union so 
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that their children would benefit from the government built by the Founding Fathers. Soldiers 
felt they must preserve the “last best hope for mankind” for their posterity. As was shown above, 
this objective was pushed by the Republican Party and played a significant part in the campaign 
against the Democratic Party and their demands for an immediate end to hostilities. As such, 
Union soldiers supporting Lincoln in 1864 often mentioned their desire that peace be secured, as 
long as it could be a lasting one. 
 Many soldiers were like Frank McGregor of the 83rd Ohio, who remarked that soldiers 
who supported McClellan must be sick of war as to hope for a “temporary peace.”116 While 
many soldiers’ comments regarding their desire for a lasting peace were often this simplistic, 
others spoke to this issue more eloquently. William B. Gates of the 3rd Ohio Cavalry was one of 
these others. He wrote, 
Give us a few more men such as Grant, Sherman, and others I could name, and Abraham 
at the head, which we must and will have for the next four years to come – and we will 
give them an everlasting peace such as history never dreamed of.117 
 
Gates’ mention of Lincoln along with Grant and Sherman is noteworthy for its implication. The 
implication being that Lincoln may help secure victory through military means every bit as much 
as the other two. 
 If Union soldiers were unsure about Lincoln before September 1864, it is likely that their 
opinion was made easier by the results of the Democratic National Convention held in Chicago. 
As has already been discussed, soldiers were decidedly against the aforementioned “war failure 
plank” included in the Democratic platform for reasons outlined above. The research supports 
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the contention that some soldiers may have decided to vote for Lincoln based on their view of 
the ideological slant presented in Chicago. The research indicates that the group of soldiers that 
expressed such sentiments was not merely choosing the lesser of two evils, as historian Jonathan 
W. White has suggested.118 Rather, it was usually a simple extension of their ideological 
commitment to the Republicans’ stated goal of finishing the war via victory. This included a 
number of War Democrat soldiers, who could not follow the Peace Democrats’ lead. George F. 
Morse, of the 91st New York, related that a majority of his comrades were Democrats, “but 
nearly all are for War until the Rebellion has been put down.”119 
 A majority of those who mentioned the platform passed in Chicago did so in regard to 
Lincoln’s electoral chances. Union soldier Thomas Campbell, in his diary, wrote: 
The Peace Party have carried everything before them. adopting platform entire. tis a 
wishy washy meaningless string of glittering generalities but breaths the spirit of peace at 
any price. McClellan was nominated unanemously with such a platform and such a 
candidate. I have no fears of the election of Lincoln.120 
 
Campbell’s writing implies disgust with the platform, which he believed called for “peace at any 
price.” Following his writing on the convention and the platform, Campbell states that he has no 
“fears of the election of Lincoln.” In other words, Campbell has no fears about Lincoln’s chances 
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for reelection after what was done at Chicago. While he does not explicitly state why he has no 
fear, it is possible that he had spoken with others about the platform and found them to have the 
same opinion, including fellow Union soldiers. Another soldier with a similar view, Frank 
Dickerson of the 5th U.S. Cavalry, mentioned the leaders of the Peace Democrats by name. 
The army has no desire to see the destinies of the country in the hands of a Pendleton, a 
Vallandigham...under whom the independence of the South would soon be recognized, 
but they wish to see the rebellion crushed out and accordingly will vote for Lincoln.121 
 
Dickerson also related the information that few soldiers he was acquainted with would vote for 
McClellan. Importantly, Dickerson mentions Pendleton’s name. Many soldiers were decidedly 
set against supporting the Democratic ticket because of the well-known Copperhead’s inclusion 
as the vice presidential candidate. Any soldier who may have felt comfortable voting for 
McClellan likely was swayed against doing so by the indicators that he would be a simple puppet 
to the Peace Democrats: the platform, as well as Pendleton’s inclusion on the ticket. Soldiers 
who expressed absolute support for McClellan are few and far between. 
 Union soldiers discussing the presidential election of 1864 followed several trends as it 
related to the distinct issue of disloyalty. According to historian William Frank Zornow, the 
Republican Party was responsible for introducing this charge against the Democrats in the 
summer of 1864, as the political campaign heated up. This is certainly seen in select campaign 
pamphlets published by organizations favorable to Lincoln’s reelection. It is clear from their 
writings that soldiers found the ideological message of the Republicans more favorable than that 
pushed by the Democrats. Their arguments in support of Lincoln make this clear. They found in 
Lincoln a candidate who would continue fighting the war until absolute military victory could be 
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achieved, devotion to the restoration of the “mystic chords of memory” that was the union, and a 
refusal to allow their sacrifice to have been made in vain. To be sure, this campaign strategy 
played to the “disgust for the party [Democratic] that had deemed their work in the field a 
‘failure,’” but the soldiers were forced to make a legitimate ideological choice in 1864.122 After 
all, the election of 1864 can be seen as a referendum on the war itself. Whether or not one voted 
to continue the war effort became an ideological issue in the framework of the election.  
In 1864, the political landscape had changed quite a bit. The two sides of the presidential 
campaign’s boundaries were drawn on the issue of whether or not to continue to fight on until 
ultimate victory. The soldiers were conscious of this decision, and decidedly chose to fight on 
until the unconditional surrender of the Confederacy. They felt that anything less than total 
victory would bring about a temporary peace unflattering to the memory and sacrifices of their 
fallen comrades. Because of this shared feeling, soldiers saw the Democratic Party as an 
organization of traitors and decried their existence in emotive language not seen in their 
discussion of other issues such as emancipation. It is likely that the disloyalty issue and the anti-
Copperhead vote was much more decisive than emancipation in soldiers’ choice to vote for 
Abraham Lincoln in 1864. 
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Chapter 3 – The Presidential Election as a Military Contest 
 Reflecting on the news of the Republicans’ victory in the crucial state elections in Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, and Indiana, Major James A. Connolly of the 123rd Illinois remarked that he and 
his comrades gave: 
Our old flag victories with the ballot as well as with the bullet. Oh, how the election news 
cheers this army! How proudly our soldiers step as they think of the defeat of Northern 
traitors! It is second alone to the fall of Richmond.123 
 
This excerpt, from a letter dated October 22, 1864, is a fine example of a third issue Union 
soldiers had in mind during the presidential campaign in the summer and fall of 1864. This third 
issue can be better classified as a “concept” that Union soldiers had in mind when discussing the 
election. Union soldiers, according to the research, conceptualized the presidential election of 
1864 as simply another in a line of battles which must be won in order to finish the war up with a 
victory. Lincoln’s triumph in the election became akin to a military victory. 
 This phenomenon is somewhat unsurprising given that the election essentially shaped up 
to be a referendum on the war itself. Perhaps this was unavoidable, given the diametrically 
opposed platforms of each party: one calling for continuation of the war and the other for an 
immediate armistice. For soldiers, as has been discussed at length thus far, the Democratic Party 
could not be trusted to deliver the victory that they wished for: an absolute, military, victory 
followed by an everlasting peace. Ending the war honorably became paramount to the men in 
blue, and since the Democrats seemed to find the war a failure on all counts, soldiers felt that 
they were traitorous. For the men in blue, this was tantamount to fighting for the Confederacy. It 
is no stretch, then, that soldiers may have come to view Democrats themselves as a legitimate 
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enemy that must be defeated at the polls. The election of 1864 became another battle that Union 
soldiers felt must be won in order to win the war and restore the union. In this chapter, I will 
examine the colorful language soldiers used to describe the elections as an extension of the war. 
 In the North, this phenomenon was not exclusive to the soldiers. Some campaign 
publications favorable to the Republican cause may have encouraged this wedding of the 
military struggle with the Lincoln administration’s (and Republicans’) struggle at the polls. A 
fine example of this is seen in the pages of the October 18, 1864 issue of the Reading, 
Pennsylvania-based Father Abraham, a campaign paper that was sent to soldiers at the front. On 
the third page, an image appears of an elephant carrying a banner reading “The Elephant Is 
Coming!” The ad declares victory, listing recent electoral victories in Pennsylvania, Indiana, 
Ohio, and Maryland, “and victory along the line!”124 Under this last declaration is a depiction of 
a Union cavalry charge. The implication is clear: the electoral victories are an extension of the 
war and vice versa. Images like this may have encouraged soldiers to think of the coming 
presidential election in these terms, but they likely came to see this connection regardless. 
 Many historians who have treated the soldier vote in some fashion acknowledge the 
feelings soldiers expressed toward Copperheads, but have largely missed the fact that at least a 
sizeable minority of these soldiers appeared to view the election as another military campaign to 
be won on the road to ending the rebellion. Historian Joseph Allen Frank comes closest to 
arguing this point when he writes,  
The 1864 U.S. presidential election crystallized issues for the Northern troops. It 
sharpened the Union troops’ political awareness by tying decisions at home to the 
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outcome of the war at the front, which enhanced the citizen-soldiers’ political 
perspicacity.125 
 
This enhanced political perspicacity, along with distaste for those they found disloyal, allowed 
for language regarding the election at home to draw a parallel between the war at the front and “a 
war at home.”126 Frank acknowledges that soldiers’ language when discussing the election and 
dissidents at home turned from political to military: “it was a ‘war’ against ‘traitors’ who were 
‘allies’ of the ‘enemy.’”127 However, Frank’s analysis stops short of declaring that soldiers 
viewed the election as an extension of the war rather than simply a parallel to the conflict they 
were fighting themselves. Moreover, Frank contends that the act of voting in the field 
“symbolized the citizen-soldier’s critical role in the war as part of an army of thinking 
bayonets.”128 The research certainly supports Frank’s assertions, however Frank does not take 
the step of showing how the connection between politics and war manifested itself in the 
soldiers’ writings. 
 The concept of politics as warfare and warfare as politics was not new in the world of 
1864. While Union soldiers may not have been aware of the writings of Carl von Clausewitz, a 
longtime Prussian soldier, any discussion on the parallels between war and politics is bare 
without mention of Clausewitz’s On War. In the pages of Clausewitz’s defining work, he writes, 
“War is a mere continuation of policy by other means.” Elaborating, he continues, “War is not 
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merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a 
carrying out of the same by other means.”129 Clausewitz observed that policy was often blended 
within the war effort, since there were always policy goals and desired outcomes. Of course, the 
most pivotal political issue interwoven within the American Civil War was that of union and the 
states’ relation to each other and to the federal government – initially. Eventually, other policies 
such as emancipation were brought to bear on the battlefield. While Union soldiers may not have 
read Clausewitz, his commentary on war proves useful in understanding the nature of war and 
the American Civil War is certainly a good example of what Clausewitz observed in warfare 
himself. Union soldiers realized that war and politics were intertwined, as we saw in their 
continued castigation of Democrats over issues directly related to war and peace. Their proximity 
to the conflict allowed them to grasp the political and military realities of a Lincoln electoral 
victory. They were able to then conceptualize the election as simply another battle they would 
have to fight themselves. 
 When discussing the coming election, some soldiers reflected upon what Lincoln’s 
election would really accomplish. They also explicitly let it be known that voting was a military 
act, where the Copperheads in the North were essentially a military enemy. And finally, that 
Lincoln’s reelection was an opportunity for a distinct victory for the Union armies. Some 
soldiers saw the effect that military victories had on the political situation, and thus believed the 
election would result in military victory, as they were intertwined. 
 A good many soldiers thought that, at base, Lincoln’s reelection would signal the 
beginning of the end for the war. A letter from a B. Bruce of Sangamon County, Illinois wrote 
home to his mother, stating that “the war… will soon end it all depends on the… campaign and 
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the Election of the president.”130 Bruce implies that the election of the president and the military 
campaign are both precursors to the end of the war. This sentiment was widespread. Also 
widespread was the belief that the reelection of Lincoln would signal to the South that the end 
was nigh, as the election would signify the continued union of all Northern states. Soldiers 
believed that the North must provide the image of a united front in prosecuting the war to its 
successful conclusion. They felt that a Lincoln reelection, based on what principles he stood for, 
would send this message of determination. 
 Their own participation in the election allowed Union soldiers to grasp the reality of their 
dual roles in the conflict: as agents of both political and military power. Soldiers were 
determined to exercise these powers for the Union cause at the polls in 1864. The connection 
between political and military spheres is apparent here, as the Republicans ran in 1864 as the 
Union Party. Soldiers thus fought for their sacred union and cast votes for the Union as well. 
Consequently, soldiers felt it their duty to vote for the Lincoln-Johnson ticket. In letters to 
Illinois governor Richard Yates, Union soldiers from the state of Illinois requested furloughs in 
order to be home to be able to cast a vote; they felt it their duty to fight for the union at the polls. 
Illinois soldiers were not allowed to vote from the field, despite efforts by state Republicans to 
pass a bill allowing them to. One Union doctor wrote from Burnside Barracks, Indiana to request 
this very thing: 
There are a great many Ill. soldiers at this place both in the 5th and 17th… who are very 
anxious to assist the Union cause in our own state at the coming election & deeming it 
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very important that all the Union strength of the state should be manifested at the polls 
would ask, whether some influence cannot be brought to bear upon the Powers that be.131 
 
This Union doctor’s language illuminates the connection between the political and military 
spheres evident in the election of 1864 as conceptualized by members of the military. He not 
only discusses soldiers “anxious to assist the Union cause,” but also mentions the “Union 
strength of the state.” Both the country as well as the new Republican moniker were identifiable 
as “Union.” 
 A soldier named I.H. Howe expressed more forceful sentiments, writing,  
We want to come home to vote. Unless you think you can beat the Enemy badly without 
us. ‘Little Mac’ says he can’t ‘look the soldiers in the face’ & give up the Union – but we 
are afraid he will do it behind our backs if he is Elected.132 
 
Howe presents the case that McClellan, and his supporters by extension, are the enemy and 
expresses soldiers’ fears for a McClellan presidency. This serves to support the argument that 
Union soldiers chose Lincoln in large part due to his stated objective of continuing the war until 
absolute victory could be brought about. Howe then signs his letter to Governor Yates of Illinois, 
“Yours for the Union – one Government, one flag, one destiny.”133 Howe’s send off is an 
indication of his belief that Lincoln’s reelection would carry with it an affirmation of the political 
goal of the war: reunion under the “one Government.” 
 Soldiers’ language in their writing on the election is indicative of their conception of the 
election’s place in the war. This could be minute, as in referring to bullets as “Lincoln Pills,” 
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which should be dealt out in “heavy doses,” or larger, as in the election results being akin to the 
results of a military success.134 R.H. Watson of the 36th Illinois believed that “it will take a 
goodeal hard fighting before the rebels will consider themselves conquered, a greateal depends 
on the coming Election.”135 Watson makes a comparison between hard fighting and the coming 
election, pointing out that he believes each will go far to putting the war to bed. 
 Some soldiers viewed their duty in late 1864 to be twofold – to provide the Lincoln 
administration with military success as well as elevate Lincoln to the presidency once again. 
Sometimes, these two objectives blurred into one. For example, Reuben T. Prentice wrote, “Look 
for a decisive stroke from our armyis to assist in changing the popular sentiments a little among 
the peace party & Copperheads in order that we may elect Abraham Lincoln.” Prentice grasped 
that the army could play a role in shaping popular sentiment at home. He lamented the absence 
of legislation providing Illinois soldiers the right to vote in the field. Of course, some soldiers 
were able to vote in Illinois due to the granting of furloughs for that purpose. Because soldiers 
could not vote from the field, Prentice hoped for a “decisive blow” to help bring about Lincoln’s 
reelection. Another soldier, Tilmon D. Kyger, believed that even if soldiers could not help by 
being present physically at the polls, they could affect Union victory there by winning military 
battles. 
 Soldier Robert Molford Addison expressed sentiments that were similar. He wrote, 
“Cheering news from the north in the relation to the election in Ohio and Indiana. If our friends 
will only be faithful and do their duty at the polls and put down the firing in the rear we will 
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attend to matters in the front.”136 Addison speaks on duty. A soldier, even if unable to vote, could 
still carry out their duty in relation to the election by continuing to fight the rebellion while their 
“friends” in the North must do the same electorally. He actively compares the “firing in the rear” 
to the Confederate army, thus conceptualizing Copperheads as an actual force that must be 
quelled. Major James A. Connolly does the same in a letter dated October 16, 1864: “We are 
close after the copperheads commanded by Hood, and if the stay at home patriots will follow the 
copperheads commanded by McClellan in the same manner I shall be content.”137 This 
characterization of Copperheads as both Democrats and Confederates seems to have been fairly 
widespread among the Union soldiers. It also seems to be an extension of the general anti-
Copperhead sentiment expressed through the disloyalty issue outlined in the previous chapter. 
 With the electoral news from the states of Ohio, Indiana, and Pennsylvania, electoral 
victories came to mean as much as military victories. Elections for seats in the House of 
Representatives from these critical states took place in October 1864. These two types of 
victories both were seen as victories for Lincoln’s chances in the later presidential election. 
Soldier John Anderson of Pennsylvania reported that his comrades were “as much rejoiced at the 
result as they were at Sheridans Victory in the Valley of the Shenandoah” as the news from 
Ohio, Indiana, and Pennsylvania arrived in camp.138 Another soldier, Charles Maxim, wrote on 
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September 11, 1864 that Atlanta “was a big blow for Old Abe.”139 In fact, Maxim believed that a 
few more such victories would silence Lincoln’s political opposition in the North. Frank 
McGregor of the 82nd Ohio agreed, writing, “If the Atlanta capture proves true it will make 
splendid capital for the admin. party to electioneer on.”140 McGregor explicitly ties the capture of 
Atlanta to Lincoln’s increased chances of victory in the election. Union soldiers were clearly 
aware of the effect that military victories would have on the voting population in the North. 
 In the same vein, soldiers believed Lincoln’s reelection would signal the end of the war. 
Warren S. Heald voiced this belief, stating, “when Lincoln is Relected the Ware will be over 
they are Whiped and only hold out for a compromise that they never can have…” George M. 
Gilchrist believed the same, though coated his words in martial language:  
I want him for our next President, and if I cannot vote – I am going to use all the 
influence I have in his favor. I do it because I think his election will do more to crush out 
this rebellion than any thing outside shot and shell…141 
 
Both Heald and Gilchrist expressed sentiments that many soldiers shared – that Lincoln’s 
election would have the effect of a major military victory and move the country toward ultimate 
victory if not right then, then soon enough. 
 Union soldiers conceptualized the presidential election of 1864 as another part of their 
continuing campaign to quell the rebellion and end the American Civil War. They took it upon 
themselves to wage a dual campaign: one military, one political. Oftentimes, as in this case, 
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these roles were inexplicably intertwined. While the issues that stemmed from the political war 
between the Republicans and the Democrats most decisively pushed Union soldiers into 
Lincoln’s camp in 1864, this specific characteristic of the election is worth noting. The 
conceptualization of the election of 1864 by Union soldiers as another Civil War victory that 
must be secured in order to save the union adds another shade to both the soldier vote as well as 
to the history of the war itself. It certainly adds another element to the characterization of the 
citizen-soldier. 
  
74 
Conclusion 
 The election of 1864 was a pivotal event in the course of the American Civil War. 
President Abraham Lincoln recognized the gravity of the event, and reflected upon its 
importance in the history of the world in response to a serenade on November 10, 1864. He 
stated, “we can not have free government without elections; and if the rebellion could force us to 
forego, or postpone a national election, it might fairly claim to have already conquered and 
ruined us.”142 Lincoln continued, stating that the peaceful and successful passing of the late 
election proved to the world that a republican government could endure through intense 
intranational military strife.  
 The electoral participation of those engaged in this military strife in 1864 is a fascinating 
feature of this pivotal event. It is even more fascinating that these men chose the candidate who 
represented continuation of the war. This alone says something about these men’s convictions 
that the nation was worth fighting for and, in 1864, was a fair indicator of their political 
ideology. The presidential election of 1864 was indeed a referendum on the war as well as the 
Lincoln administration’s handling of it. And the soldiers chose to support Lincoln for reelection 
in droves. 
 Pinning down one definitive reason that Union soldiers supported Lincoln so 
overwhelmingly is not a task characterized by ease. To make a generalization and point to any 
one reason does these men a disservice. Historians who have grappled with this issue have often 
tried to point to one issue, the most prominent being the issue of emancipation, and attempt to 
frame the soldier vote as a direct response to it. This issue has become a bone of contention 
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within the historiography of late, with the recent publication of historian Jonathan W. White’s 
Emancipation, The Union Army, and the Reelection of Abraham Lincoln. White makes it his 
primary objective to dispel the idea that soldiers ideologically supported emancipation and the 
rest of the Republican Party’s policies for that matter. 
 However, upon reflection of the soldiers’ letters and diaries researched here, it becomes 
apparent that the argument over whether emancipation figured largely in the soldier’s mind 
during the electoral campaign misses the larger picture. Union soldiers, in general, opposed any 
efforts they thought to be deleterious to the progress of the war. While this might not seem to be 
an ideological stance, the Republican Party’s platform and campaign were seemingly built 
around the continuation of the war until the Union could be restored. Union soldiers expressed 
the tenets of the Republican campaign within their letters and diaries. They expressed the wish 
that the Union could be restored and decried any efforts to stall the progress of the war. They 
wished to push on so that their sacrifices would not have been made in vain. They came to 
support emancipation as a policy of ending the war. They adamantly opposed the Democratic 
Party platform in doing so. These were entirely ideological positions within the context of this 
particular presidential election. 
 And so Charles Francis Adams, Jr’s observation on Union soldiers’ opinions on the 
campaign proved prescient as it relates to the issues that soldiers explicitly speak to within their 
letters and diaries immediately preceding the election. Adams observed,  
Soldiers don’t vote for individuals; they don’t vote for the war; they have but one desire 
and that is to vote against those who delay the progress of the war at home; they want to 
vote down the copperheads.143 
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Adams himself served in the Union army during the Civil War, and recorded these observations 
on how he believed the soldiers would vote and why. Obviously, he places most stock in the 
soldier vote as a force to take down the Democratic Party, who seemingly stymied the war effort 
from the home front. Undoubtedly, the Copperheads figured into the soldiers’ writings and 
influenced highly emotive language from the soldiers’ pens. However, it is apparent that their 
ideological stance, including their stance on emancipation, indeed stemmed from their feelings 
on this ideological battle. In fact, some Union soldiers even came to view the election as a battle 
in and of itself. 
 In sum, Union soldiers voted for Abraham Lincoln for a myriad of reasons that can be 
summed up as an ideological commitment to the Republican Party in 1864. In this context, 
soldiers were committed to the continuation of the war effort until ultimate victory could be 
achieved via success on the battlefield. Soldiers supported fighting until the Union could be 
restored, and if the policy of emancipation was necessary to do so, then they supported that as 
well. To be absolutely clear, their support for Lincoln was a positive endorsement of the 
Republican Party, and not simply a pragmatic choice or a choice of the lesser of two evils, as 
historian Jonathan W. White has attempted to paint it. 
While this new synthesis of evidence provides a new way of looking at the soldier vote, 
there are natural limitations given the nature of the source material. There is a poignant quote 
that perfectly illustrates my meaning concerning the use of primary sources like Civil War 
soldier letters and diaries written by historian James I. Robertson in his study of Civil War 
soldiers. Robertson states, “This is a work that could be written a dozen different times without 
repetition.”144 A consistent effort was made to represent these men’s words and thoughts 
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accurately without cherry-picking information to fit a certain framework. Union soldiers 
generally voiced their opinions openly but they do not answer the specific questions historians 
have asked of them. However, their words can provide new meaning if one is patient enough to 
listen. 
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